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WITH ALL MY WORLDLY GOODS I THEE ENDOW: THE LAW AND 
STATISTICS OF DOWER AND CURTESY IN ARKANSAS 
J. Cliff McKinney* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dower and curtesy are ancient doctrines that have been a part of Ar-
kansas law since the dawn of statehood.1 Though many states have aban-
doned dower and curtesy, the concepts remain a basic provision of Arkansas 
law.2 This article explores the current status of the law in Arkansas including 
a detailed analysis of the current statutory system along with a sampling of 
some of the myriad associated common law concepts and interpretative fea-
tures.3 
Most importantly, though, this article examines the real life application 
of dower and curtesy in Arkansas through an empirical study examining 
more than a decade of deeds filed in fifteen Pulaski County neighborhoods 
representing a cross-section of socio-economic backgrounds.4 The study 
provides statistics that might help policymakers decide the fate of dower and 
 
        *   J. Cliff McKinney is a Managing Member of Quattlebaum, Grooms & Tull PLLC 
where his practice focuses on real estate, land use and business law. He also serves as an 
Adjunct Professor at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of 
Law. He holds a B.A. from Baylor University, a M.P.A. and J.D. from the University of 
Arkansas and a LL.M. from Southern Methodist University. He would like to thank Professor 
Lynn Foster for her encouragement and suggestions on this article. 
 1. See Hill’s Adm’rs v. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 608, 610 (1844), overruled in part by Menif-
ee’s Adm’rs v. Menifee, 8 Ark. 9 (1847). 
 2. The issue of which states retain dower and curtesy and which ones do not is exten-
sively discussed in Joslyn R. Muller, Haven’t Women Obtained Equality? An Analysis of the 
Constitutionality of Dower in Michigan, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 533, 555 (2010). I, there-
fore, decided not to replicate this work. Ms. Muller’s article points out that the status of dow-
er and curtesy in some states can be confusing becuase some states have abolished curtesy 
but not dower, or have adopted an elective share concept that is very similar, if not identical, 
to dower and curtesy. See id. at 543. From Appendix A in her article, it appears that approxi-
mately sixteen states retain dower and curtesy in some form, see id. at 555, though one could 
argue for a higher or lower number depending on the interpretation given to how some states 
have handled the supposed abolition. As pointed out in Appendix A, of the states surrounding 
Arkansas, dower and curtesy have been abolished in Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and 
Oklahoma. See id. Louisiana never had the concepts of dower and curtesy. See id. Texas does 
not have the concepts either, though it has a similar mechanism for homestead property. See 
id. 
 3. See infra Parts IV, V. 
 4. See infra Part VI. 
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curtesy in Arkansas.5 For instance, the study discusses potentially significant 
findings such as: 
(i) A non-titled spouse joined a deed to release his or her dower or curte-
sy in 18.6% of conveyances; 
(ii) A woman is two and a half times (2.5x) more likely to not have legal 
title to her husband’s property than a man is to not have legal title to his 
wife’s property; and 
(iii) Women are more likely to use a risky method of releasing dower ra-




Statistics like these might help the Arkansas General Assembly decide 
the fate of dower and curtesy in Arkansas. The Arkansas General Assembly, 
hopefully with the aid of these statistics, must decide whether the thousand-
year-old concepts of dower and curtesy still have a legitimate role to play in 
Arkansas’s legal system or whether they are concepts that need to be con-
signed to history. 
As a preliminary drafting note, throughout this article I often refer just 
to “dower” when the reference may be equally applicable to curtesy. Since 
Act 714 of 1981, which will be discussed in greater detail below, Arkansas 
treats dower and curtesy exactly the same with the only distinction being 
that dower refers to the wife’s interest and curtesy refers to the husband’s 
interest.7 In other words, today, the only distinction between dower and cur-
tesy is one of grammar. Another reason for the reference simply to “dower” 
instead of “dower and curtesy” is that the vast majority of the case law con-
cerns an interpretation of a wife’s dower interest. As of the writing of this 
article, there are 1,389 Arkansas cases including the word “dower.”8 Of 
these cases, only 337 Arkansas cases also include the word “curtesy.”9 In 
contrast, only 80 Arkansas cases include the word “curtesy” and exclude the 
word “dower.”10 In other words, nearly 62% of the cases only concern dow-
er and fewer than 6% are just curtesy cases. 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-101 to -405 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2015). 
 8. This result derives from a WestlawNext search in the database “Arkansas” for cases 
containing the word “dower” that was conducted on December 4, 2015. 
 9. This result derives from a WestlawNext search in the database “Arkansas” for cases 
containing both the word “dower” and “curtesy” (advanced: dower & curtesy) that was con-
ducted on December 4, 2015. 
 10. This result derives from a WestlawNext search in the database “Arkansas” for cases 
containing the word “curtesy,” but excluding the word “dower” (advanced: curtesy % dower) 
that was conducted on December 4, 2015. 
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II. THE ORIGINS 
Dower and curtesy are extremely old legal doctrines. The concept of 
dower was enshrined in English common law more than eight hundred years 
ago through the seventh clause of the Magna Carta, which reads as follows 
in modern translation: 
A widow, after the death of her husband, is immediately and without any 
difficulty to have her marriage portion and her inheritance, nor is she to 
pay anything for her dower or her marriage portion or for her inheritance 
which her husband and she held on the day of her husband’s death, and 
she shall remain in the chief dwelling place of her husband for forty days 
after her husband’s death, within which time dower will be assigned her 
if it has not already been assigned, unless that house is a castle, and if it 
is a castle which she leaves, then a suitable house will immediately be 
provided for her in which she may properly dwell until her dower is as-
signed to her in accordance with what is aforesaid, and in the meantime 
she is to have her reasonable necessities (estoverium) from the common 
property. As dower she will be assigned the third part of all the lands of 
her husband which were his during his lifetime, save when she was dow-
ered with less at the church door.
11
 
The doctrines of dower and curtesy have manifested themselves in 
many ways over the last millennia, even appearing in such revered works as 
The Canterbury Tales.12 When Geoffrey Chaucer describes the characters in 
the General Prologue to his late 1300’s masterwork, he describes the Friar 
as: 
A FRIAR there was, a wanton one and merry, 
A Limiter, a very jovial man. 
In all the friars’ four orders none that can 
Lead a discussion in fairer language. 
And he had arranged many a marriage 
Of young women, granting each a dower.13 
 
Arkansas law imported the concepts of dower and curtesy from English 
common law by virtue of the state’s Reception Statute, which states: 
The common law of England, so far as it is applicable and of a general 
nature, and all statutes of the British Parliament in aid of or to supply the 
 
 11. Featured Document: The Magna Carta, cl. 7 (Nicholas Vincent trans.), NAT’L 
ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/magna_carta 
/translation.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). 
 12. See Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales: General Prologue (A.S. Kline trans.), 
http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/English/CanterburyTalesI.htm. 
 13. Id. 
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defects of the common law made prior to March 24, 1606, which are ap-
plicable to our own form of government, of a general nature and not lo-
cal to that kingdom, and not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws 
of the United States or the Constitution and laws of this state, shall be the 
rule of decision in this state unless altered or repealed by the General As-
sembly of this state.
14
 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas recognized dower as part of the state’s 
common law at least as early as 1844 when the court gave a recitation of the 
concept’s history and application as understood by the court: 
It is difficult to trace the true origin of dower, but all writers admit it to 
be of great antiquity. It is probable that it first grew out of the customs of 
the northern nations, who subdued the Roman Empire; and that its intro-
duction into the jurisprudence of England was borrowed from the usages 
of the Germans or Danes. Like every other species of property, dower 
underwent a great many changes. It was, however, finally established 
and confirmed by the law of Magna Charta; and from that time to the 
present the term “dower” has had a legal and technical meaning, which 
in England it still retains. 
Dower at the common law exists where a man seized of an estate of in-
heritance, dies in the life time of his wife, in which case she is entitled to 
be endowed, during her natural life, of one-third part of all his lands and 
tenements, whereof he was seized at any time during the coverture, and 
which any issue she might have had, could by possibility have inherited. 
2 Black. Com., 129; 4 Kent. Com., 35. The reason of this allowance is 
said to be for the maintenance of the wife and the support and education 
of her younger children. To constitute a tenancy in dower three things 
are necessary. 1st. marriage. 2d, seizin of the husband. And, 3d, his 
death. A seizin in law, as well as in deed, entitled the wife to dower upon 
the principle that she had no power to reduce her husband’s lands into 
actual possession. The right of dower attached upon all marriages not ab-
solutely void, and existing at the death of the husband. The seizin of the 
husband for the mere transitory instant, where the estate passes in and 
out of him at the same time, or where he has a mere naked trustee with-
out any beneficial interest in the inheritance will not entitle the wife to 
dower. 
A widow gave nothing for her dower; and she was allowed to tarry in the 
mansion house forty days after the death of her husband, and in that time 
her dower was to be assigned, and during her continuance a reasonable 
support was allowed her out of the estate.
15 
 
 14. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-119 (Repl. 2008). 
 15. Hill’s Adm’rs v. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 608, 610 (1844), overruled in part by Menifee’s 
Adm’rs v. Menifee, 8 Ark. 9 (1847). 
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Common law defined curtesy as, “an estate for life which the husband 
acquires upon the birth of lawful issue of the marriage born alive and capa-
ble of inheriting, in the lands or tenements of which his wife is seized in fee 
simple, or in tail.”16 Common law further provided, “[t]o entitle a husband to 
an estate by the curtesy it is necessary that the wife be seised17 during cover-
ture of an estate of inheritance in land.”18 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 
At common law and as originally codified in Arkansas, dower and cur-
tesy provided different rights to wives than husbands. At common law, cur-
tesy differed from dower in six principal respects: 
(1) curtesy entitled the husband to an estate in all the wife’s inheritable 
freeholds, whereas dower entitled the widow to an interest in only one-
third of the husband’s; (2) actual seisin on the part of the wife was re-
quired for curtesy, whereas seisin in law was sufficient for dower; (3) 
curtesy attached to the wife’s equitable as well as to her legal interests, 
whereas dower was confined to the husband’s legal estates; (4) a re-
quirement for curtesy was the birth of issue, whereas there was no such 
requirement for dower; (5) before the wife’s death curtesy was a present 
estate, whereas dower was only a protected expectancy before the hus-
band’s death; (6) since curtesy attached to all the wife’s lands, rather 




In 1981, the Supreme Court of Arkansas addressed the constitutionality 
of the dower and curtesy statutes as they then existed.20 In Stokes v. Stokes, 
the administrator of Mr. Carl Stokes’ estate, the step-son of the widow, chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the dower laws on the basis that they violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.21 At that time, a dower interest conferred more 
rights on a wife than curtesy conveyed on a husband.22 Specifically, the law 
at the time conveyed the following advantages on women: 
 
 16. Sadler v. Campbell, 150 Ark. 594, 605, 236 S.W. 588, 592 (1921). 
 17. The term seisin can be spelled either as “seisin” or “seizin”. For purposes of this 
article, I use the spelling “seisin” except for quotes where the alternate spelling is used. Sei-
sin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 18. Owens v. Jabine, 88 Ark. 468, 472, 115 S.W. 383, 384 (1908). 
 19. George L. Haskins, Curtesy in the United States, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 196, 197 
(1951). 
 20. See Stokes v. Stokes, 271 Ark. 300, 613 S.W.2d 372 (1981). 
 21. Id. at 301, 613 S.W.2d at 374. 
 22. See id. at 303–05, 613 S.W.2d at 374–76. 
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1. In the context of a spouse electing against the will, the law gave a 
woman a dower interest plus her homestead rights and statutory allow-
ances while a man only received a curtesy interest in such circumstances 
and not the homestead rights and statutory allowances.
23
 
2. The law gave a husband a curtesy interest only in the land the wife 
owned at her death so a wife could dispose of her property at any time 
during the marriage without her husband’s consent.
24
 A wife, on the oth-
er hand, had a dower interest in all property held by the husband at any 
time during the marriage meaning that a husband could not dispose of 
his property during the marriage without the wife’s consent.
25
 
3. The law gave a wife a dower interest in one third of her husband’s 
personal property owned at his death but gave a husband no such right.
26
 
4. The law gave a wife a dower interest in bonds, bills, notes, books, ac-
counts and evidence of debt which the husband owned during the mar-
riage meaning that the wife’s consent was required to dispose of the in-
struments. There was no parallel right for men.
27
 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas noted that the Supreme Court of the 
United States consistently struck down all gender based laws unless the laws 
“serve a legitimate governmental purpose and are reasonably designed to 
accomplish that purpose.”28 The court found no legitimate basis for the dis-
crimination in these laws and declared them unconstitutional.29 
The same day as the Stokes v. Stokes decision, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas issued a companion decision in Hess v. Wims.30 In Hess, Hoyt 
Wims, his father, and his two sisters entered into an apparently unwritten 
agreement whereby Hoyt was given the proceeds of his mother’s estate to 
purchase fifty-seven acres in St. Francis County, the place where the chil-
dren had grown up.31 Under the arrangement, Hoyt agreed to let the father 
live on the property until his death then leave the land to his two sisters in 
his will.32 Hoyt prepared a will leaving all of his property to his sisters.33 
After his father died, Hoyt was diagnosed with a terminal illness.34 During 
 
 23. Id. at 303–05, 613 S.W.2d 372 at 374–76. 
 24. Id., 613 S.W.2d 372 at 374–76. 
 25. Id., 613 S.W.2d 372 at 374–76. 
 26. Stokes, 271 Ark. at 303–05, 613 S.W.2d 372 at 374–76. 
 27. Id., 613 S.W.2d 372 at 374–76. 
 28. Id. at 303, 613 S.W.2d 372, 375. 
 29. See id. at 304–05, 613 S.W.2d at 375–76. 
 30. Hess v. Wims, 272 Ark. 43, 613 S.W.2d 85 (1981). 
 31. Id. at 45, 613 S.W.2d at 85. 
 32. Id., 613 S.W.2d at 85. 
 33. Id., 613 S.W.2d at 85. 
 34. Id., 613 S.W.2d at 85. 
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the last year of his life, Hoyt married Geraldine Wims.35 After Hoyt’s death, 
Geraldine elected to take against the will and petitioned the probate court for 
her statutory allowances, dower, and homestead interests.36 Hoyt’s sisters 
challenged the law that allowed Geraldine to elect against the will and claim 
a dower interest as unconstitutional, using the same arguments asserted in 
Stokes that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating males 
and females differently.37 
The court in Hess stated that it was ruling the dower laws unconstitu-
tional in the Stokes decision being announced the same day but provided 
additional explanation for its rationale.38 The court said, “[d]ower is an in-
choate right, while curtesy may be defeated.”39 The court further stated that 
“[n]o valid compensatory purpose or justifiable governmental function can 
be found to sustain this gender-based discrimination.”40 The court said that 
the rationale for the discriminatory nature of the law at the time was “the 
presumption that all males are superior to females in financial matters.”41 
The court noted several Supreme Court of the United States decisions inval-
idating laws based on this presumption, including the Wengler v. Druggist 
Mutual Ins. Co. decision from the previous year, which invalidated a Mis-
souri workers’ compensation law denying a widower benefits on a wife’s 
work-related death while granting a widow benefits.42 The Supreme Court of 
Arkansas recognized that dower laws had been favored provisions of Arkan-
sas law for nearly 150 years but said, “it is now impermissible to presume 
that all females are inferior to males in financial matters.”43 
In a separate case decided later the same year as the Stokes and Hess 
decisions, the Supreme Court of Arkansas struck down another of the then-
existing dower laws.44 That law allowed a wife to take dower and elect 
against a will regardless of when the husband executed the will but gave the 
husband the same right only if the wife executed the will before the mar-
riage.45 
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Arkansas issued a slight revision 
to the Stokes decision in the case of Beck v. Merritt.46 In Stokes, the court 
 
 35. Id., 613 S.W.2d at 85. 
 36. Hess, 272 Ark. at 45, 613 S.W.2d at 85 
 37. See id. at 45–46, 613 S.W.2d at 85–86. 
 38. See id. at 46–48, 613 S.W.2d at 86–87. 
 39. Id. at 46, 613 S.W.2d at 86. 
 40. Id., 613 S.W.2d at 86. 
 41. Id., 613 S.W.2d at 86. 
 42. Hess, 272 Ark. at 46, 613 S.W.2d at 86 (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 
446 U.S. 142, 149 (1980)). 
 43. Id. at 48, 613 S.W.2d at 87. 
 44. See Hall v. Hall, 274 Ark. 266, 266–67, 623 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1981). 
 45. See id., 623 S.W.2d at 834. 
 46. See Beck v. Merritt, 280 Ark. 331, 335, 657 S.W.2d 549, 551 (1983). 
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invalidated the entire statute that gave widows the right to elect against the 
will and claim a dower interest.47 In intestate situations, however, both hus-
band and wife received the equivalent interest under the law that existed at 
the time.48 Because there was no gender-based difference in the operation of 
the statute in the intestate situation, the court clarified its ruling in Stokes to 
preserve the validity of the previously stricken statute.49 The court reaf-
firmed this decision again the following month in Dent v. Rose.50 
The Arkansas General Assembly responded to Stokes and Hess by 
adopting Act 714 of 1981 (“Act”).51 The Act remains in effect today and is 
discussed at length in the following section. It should be noted that the Act 
is not retroactive, though this likely has little or no consequence now that we 
are thirty-five years removed from the adoption of the Act.52 
IV. THE ACT 
The Act overhauled the system of dower and curtesy in Arkansas in the 
wake of Stokes and Hess to make the application of both equal and gender 
neutral.53 While the Act completely overhauled dower and curtesy and fixed 
the constitutional problems, the Act preserved some concepts from older 
acts and retained significant portions of earlier versions of the Act.54 Conse-
quently, much of the case law discussed herein interpreting the Act predates 
the Act, in many instances by well-over a century, but those interpretations 
were of nearly identical statutory language. As such, those decisions remain 
good law to this day. 
A. The Relationship to Common Law 
It is important to focus on the relationship between the Act and com-
mon law. Dower is both an equitable and statutory right.55 In interpreting 
predecessors of the Act, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has been careful to 
note that the statutory provisions expand or “enlarge” the common law right 
of dower rather than supplant the common law.56 In other words, “[t]he term 
dower has a common law meaning, importing an estate for life, not to be 
 
 47. See id., 657 S.W.2d at 551. 
 48. See id., 657 S.W.2d at 551. 
 49. See id., 657 S.W.2d at 551. 
 50. Dent v. Rose, 281 Ark. 42, 42–43, 661 S.W.2d 361, 361 (1983). 
 51. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-101 to -405 (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2015). 
 52. Hall v. Hall, 274 Ark. 266, 268, 623 S.W.2d 833, 834 (1981). 
 53. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-101 to -405. 
 54. See, e.g., id. § 28-11-306 (Repl. 2012). 
 55. See Johnson v. Johnson, 84 Ark. 307, 308, 105 S.W. 869, 870 (1907). 
 56. See Arbaugh v. West, 127 Ark. 98, 104, 192 S.W. 171, 173 (1917). 
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controlled without a contrary intention clearly manifested by the statute.”57 
This is a critical distinction because it means that all common law rights and 
interpretations of those rights survive except to the extent such may be in 
direct conflict with the Act.58 This also means that a repeal of the Act would 
not necessarily eliminate the common law rights unless the General Assem-
bly specifically abolished the common law rights. Alternatively, if the Gen-
eral Assembly repealed the Act without abolishing the common law rights, 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas might invalidate the common law rights as 
unconstitutional because those rights differ for men and women. 
In McGuire v. Cook, the court outlined its approach to preserving 
common law principals in interpreting and applying the Act except to the 
extent of direct conflict.59 At issue in the case was the question of the hus-
band’s seisin to the property being claimed by the widow.60 The question 
was whether the statutory provisions regarding seisin abrogated common 
law requirements or interpretations of this requirement.61 The court held, 
“[b]y this enactment [a predecessor of the Act] we do not think the Legisla-
ture intended to create in the widow an estate in her deceased husband’s 
lands different in any essential from the estate of dower known at the com-
mon law, except as therein expressly provided.”62 The court also held, “[t]he 
same character of seisin that was required by the common law in the hus-
band is required by our statute in order to entitle the widow to dower.”63 
B. Analysis of the Act and Interpretive Case Law 
1. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-101. Definition, and    
Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-102. Death of Spouse 
The Act begins with a definitions section containing just one definition: 
“‘endowed’ means invested and shall apply both to dower and curtesy.”64 
The statute then states the foundational principle: 
At the death of any surviving spouse who has dower or curtesy for life in 
land, the property shall descend in accordance with the will of the first 
 
 57. Brown v. Collins, 14 Ark. 421, 421 (1854). 
 58. See, e.g., Stull v. Graham, 60 Ark. 461, 475, 31 S.W. 46, 50 (1895) (holding that the 
statutes “enlarge” the widow’s common law quarantine rights). 
 59. See McGuire v. Cook, 98 Ark. 118, 135 S.W. 840 (1911). 
 60. Id. at 120, 135 S.W. at 841. 
 61. Id. at 121, 135 S.W. at 841. 
 62. Id., 135 S.W. at 841. 
 63. Id. at 122, 135 S.W. at 841. 
 64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-101 (Repl. 2012). 
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deceased spouse or, if the first spouse died intestate, then to descend in 
accordance with the law for the distribution of intestates’ estates.
65
 
2. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-201. Termination of 
Rights 
The next section of the Act states: 
(a) No act, deed, or conveyance executed or performed by one (1) spouse 
without the assent of the other spouse, evinced by acknowledgment in 
the manner required by law, shall pass the estate of dower or curtesy. 
(b) No judgment, default, covin, or crime of one (1) spouse shall preju-
dice the right of the other spouse to curtesy or dower, or preclude either 
spouse from the recovery thereof, if otherwise entitled thereto.
66 
 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas 
summarized this particular section of the statute as standing for the princi-
ple: 
Ordinarily, when a married person sells real property, the conveyance 
thereof contains a relinquishment of the non-owner spouse’s right of 
dower or curtesy. There is, however, no requirement that the non-owner 
spouse relinquish a dower or curtesy interest when property is conveyed 
by the spouse who owns it, and a conveyance without the appropriate re-
lease does not deprive the non-owner spouse of dower or curtesy with 
respect to the property in question.
67
 
3. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-202. Alien as Native-
Born Citizen 
The next provision of the statute provides, “[t]he surviving spouse of 
an alien shall be entitled to dower in the estate of the deceased spouse in the 
same manner as if the alien had been a native-born citizen of this state.”68 
This portion of the statute has never been subject to judicial interpretation, 
despite originating in 1939, but it is self-explanatory in that dower and cur-
tesy rights are not reserved just to citizens. 
 
 65. Id. § 28-11-102 (Repl. 2012). 
 66. Id. § 28-11-201 (Repl. 2012). 
 67. United States v. Fincher, Crim. No. 06-50064-001, 2009 WL 485411, at *2 (W.D. 
Ark. Feb. 26, 2009), aff’d, 593 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-202 (Repl. 2012). 
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4. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-203. Bar to Inchoate 
Rights—Time Limitation 
The next provision of the statute, which is possibly one of the most 
functionally important parts of the statute, provides: 
(a) The inchoate right of dower or curtesy of any spouse in real property 
in the State of Arkansas is barred in all cases when or where the other 
spouse has been barred of title or of any interest in the property for seven 
(7) years or more and also in real property or interest conveyed by the 
husband or wife but not signed by the other spouse when the conveyance 
is made or has been made for a period of seven (7) years or more. 
(b)(1) This section shall affect the inchoate right of dower and curtesy of 
a spouse in real property in this state only where or when the husband or 
wife has been barred of title for seven (7) years or more, or when a con-
veyance by the husband or wife, without the signature of the other 
spouse, has been made for a period of seven (7) years or more. 
(2) However, this section shall not apply unless the instrument of con-
veyance by the husband or wife has been of record for at least seven (7) 
years.
69 
This provision is critical because it bars a spouse from asserting dower 
or curtesy more than seven years after the property is transferred without the 
spouse’s joinder. In other words, if a husband conveys title without his 
wife’s signature, the wife’s inchoate dower interest goes away if the hus-
band survives for at least seven years. The case of Smith v. Smith illustrates 
how this concept functions.70 
In 1963, Mr. Ray Smith agreed to sell 72 acres of land to his brother, 
Mr. Conger Smith, for $5,490 based on an installment land sales contract 
that was to be paid out over two years.71 Ray’s wife did not sign the install-
ment land sales contract.72 Conger failed to make the required payments, but 
Ray accepted installments off-and-on through 1972.73 In 1977, Conger, who 
remained in possession of the land, demanded to know the final pay-off so 
he could buy the land, though Ray testified that he considered the install-
ment land sales contract void by the long passage of time.74 
The trial court determined that the installment land sales contract was 
still in force subject to a remaining debt of $2,181.04 and ordered Ray to 
 
 69. Id. § 28-11-203 (Repl. 2012). 
 70. Smith v. Smith, 268 Ark. 993, 597 S.W.2d 848 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980). 
 71. Id. at 995, 597 S.W.2d at 849. 
 72. Id., 597 S.W.2d at 849. 
 73. Id., 597 S.W.2d at 849. 
 74. Id. at 995–96, 597 S.W.2d at 849. 
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convey the land to Conger upon the payment of the balance.75 Ray’s wife, 
however, refused to sign and could not be required to do so.76 The Arkansas 
Court of Appeals then faced the issue of what to do should Ray predecease 
his wife at some point.77 The court had to determine if Ray’s wife was al-
ready barred from asserting dower by the passage of more than seven years 
since Ray and Conger signed the installment land sales contract.78 The court 
of appeals concluded, “[a] mere contract to convey does not cause the stat-
ute [that bars dower after seven years] to become operative.”79 
The court of appeals concluded the appropriate remedy would be to re-
duce the purchase price by the value of the dower interest that Ray’s wife 
might someday be able to assert should Ray predecease her in fewer than 
seven years after the actual conveyance of title to Conger.80 The court of 
appeals did not provide a formula for determining this but remanded the 
issue back to the trial court to determine the value.81 The court of appeals 
also ordered that Ray be granted a lien on the property in the amount of such 
deduction with an order that Conger pay such amount to Ray in the event 
that the wife’s inchoate dower interest terminates, which could be because 
of her predeceasing Ray or the passage of the seven years.82 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas reached the same outcome in the 1942 
case of Sebold v. Williamson, where the seller’s wife refused to sign the 
deed after her husband entered into a contract to sell property.83 The court 
determined that the purchase price should be abated by the value of Mrs. 
Sebold’s dower interest, with Mr. Sebold retaining a lien against the proper-
ty to recover such abatement from the purchaser in the event Mrs. Sebold’s 
inchoate dower interest terminates without becoming vested.84 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas 
also reached the same outcome in the case of Fletcher v. Felker but added 
an additional requirement regarding interest on the abated amount.85 In 
Fletcher, Grace Fletcher refused to sign the deed that her husband had con-
tracted to provide.86 As with the other described cases, the court ordered the 
purchase price to be abated by the potential value of Mrs. Fletcher’s incho-
 
 75. Id. at 996, 597 S.W.2d at 849. 
 76. See Smith, 268 Ark. at 994, 597 S.W.2d at 848. 
 77. See id. at 996, 597 S.W.2d at 849. 
 78. See id. at 997, 597 S.W.2d at 850. 
 79. Id., 597 S.W.2d at 850. 
 80. Id., 597 S.W.2d at 850. 
 81. Id., 597 S.W.2d at 850. 
 82. Smith, 268 Ark. at 997–98, 597 S.W.2d at 850. 
 83. Sebold v. Williamson, 203 Ark. 741, 742–43, 158 S.W.2d 667, 667 (1942). 
 84. Id. at 743–45, 158 S.W.2d at 668. 
 85. See Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Ark. 1951). 
 86. Id. at 756. 
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ate dower interest.87 The court granted Mrs. Fletcher’s husband a lien 
against the property to be paid the abated purchase price in the event 
Grace’s inchoate rights terminated without vesting.88 In the event Mrs. 
Fletcher’s inchoate rights terminated without vesting, then the buyer was 
ordered to pay the abated purchase price plus 6% interest.89 
5. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-204. Murder of Spouse—
Effect 
The statute voids dower and curtesy in the event that one spouse mur-
ders the other.90 The statute provides the following: 
(a) Whenever a spouse shall kill or slay his or her spouse and the killing 
or slaying would under the law constitute murder, either in the first or 
second degree, and that spouse shall be convicted of murder for the kill-
ing or slaying, in either the first or second degree, the one so convicted 
shall not be endowed in the real or personal estate of the decedent spouse 
so killed or slain. 
(b) In the event that a decedent spouse under this section dies without a 
will, the descendents [sic] of the one so convicted shall not benefit from 
the estate of the decedent spouse unless the descendents [sic] of the 
spouse that committed the murder are also descendants of the decedent 
spouse.
91 
Part (a) of this statute has been the law since at least 1927 and has not 
changed since 1939, but part (b) was only recently added with the addition 
of Act 1019 of 2013.92 This new provision prevents a homicidal spouse from 
benefiting his or her children, at least when the murdered spouse dies intes-
tate, if those children are not also the children of the murdered spouse.93 
This is consistent with the long-established public policy that one should not 
profit from committing homicide.94 This statute does not change the dower 
or curtesy rights of a surviving spouse in the event that a spouse commits 
suicide.95 
An interesting, though sad, question raised by this statute is what hap-
pens in the case of a domestic murder/suicide. In Luecke v. Mercantile Bank 
 
 87. See id. at 764. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (Supp. 2015). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; Barnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark. 118, 122, 124, 161 S.W.2d 8, 10, 11 (1942). 
 93. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204(b). 
 94. See Belt v. Baser, 238 Ark. 644, 648, 383 S.W.2d 657, 659 (1964). 
 95. See Phipps v. Wilson, 251 Ark. 377, 382, 472 S.W.2d 929, 932 (1971). 
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of Jonesboro, Mr. S. L. Simpson murdered his wife, Mrs. Nell Simpson, 
then tried to kill himself, succumbing the day after killing his wife.96 The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas considered what, if any, effect this type of death 
had on the estates of the respective parties.97 The court confirmed that Mrs. 
Simpson did not receive any dower rights since she predeceased her hus-
band even though her husband intentionally caused her death.98 
The most interesting case interpreting this statute is the unfortunate 
case of Barnes v. Cooper.99 In this case, Mrs. Minnie Maude Cooper killed 
her husband, Mr. D. O. Cooper, then killed herself about thirty minutes lat-
er.100 There were no children born of their marriage, though both had chil-
dren from prior relationships.101 Mr. Cooper’s estate contained $2,478.93 in 
personal property, and Mrs. Cooper’s family asserted that she was entitled to 
approximately half as her separate property, plus her one-third dower inter-
est and $450 in statutory allowances.102 After all of the deductions that Mrs. 
Cooper’s children claimed, it left Mr. Cooper’s children with just $344.65, 
which also had to be used to pay the expense of administering the estate.103 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas described this situation as leaving Mr. 
Cooper’s children with “everything the hen laid except the egg.”104 For rea-
sons not relevant to this article, the court determined that Mrs. Cooper was 
not entitled to half of the estate as her separate property or to a spousal al-
lowance leaving the primary question before the court as to Mrs. Cooper’s 
dower rights.105 
The court had to decide if Mrs. Cooper was entitled to dower in light of 
killing her husband because she was not convicted of murder having never 
faced trial becuase she committed suicide just thirty minutes after the kill-
ing.106 The court considered case law from several states and concluded that 
states with similar statutes require the spouse to be convicted before forfeit-
ing dower.107 The court observed, 
All the courts hold that a sane beneficiary who unlawfully and felonious-
ly kills the insured cannot recover as beneficiary. But the courts [refer-
 
 96. Luecke v. Mercantile Bank of Jonesboro, 286 Ark. 304, 305, 691 S.W.2d 843, 844 
(1985). 
 97. Id., 691 S.W.2d at 844. 
 98. See id. at 308, 691 S.W.2d at 846. 
 99. Barnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark. 118, 161 S.W.2d 8 (1942). 
 100. Id. at 119, 161 S.W.2d at 9. 
 101. Id., 161 S.W.2d at 9. 
 102. Id., 161 S.W.2d at 9. 
 103. Id. at 120, 161 S.W.2d at 9. 
 104. Id., 161 S.W.2d at 9. 
 105. See Barnes, 204 Ark. at 121, 161 S.W.2d at 9–10. 
 106. See id., 161 S.W.2d at 10. 
 107. See id. at 121–22, 161 S.W.2d at 10. 
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ring to other state decisions] are divided as to whether the beneficiary, in 
such case, may share in the proceeds, which go to the estate, as heir or 
take dower as widow. As to the ordinary estate of a deceased spouse who 
was murdered by the other spouse who was convicted thereof, the legis-
lature has said that such a spouse shall not be endowed. Having stated 
the conditions on which dower will be denied, it follows that, such con-
ditions excepted, the spouse will be endowed in the real and personal 
property of the deceased spouse.
108
 
Put another way, the court stated, “[s]ince Minnie Maude Cooper was 
not tried or convicted of murder for the killing of her husband, but commit-
ted suicide shortly thereafter, the above statute does not exclude her or her 
heirs from asserting dower in her husband’s property.”109 Arguably, this 
outcome seems to violate the basic public policy that one should not profit 
from committing homicide.110 The legislature, however, has had more than 
seventy years to modify the statute to change this outcome but has never 
decided to do so. 
6. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-301. Third Part of Land 
One of the most essential parts of the Act provides: 
(a) If a person dies leaving a surviving spouse and a child or children, the 
surviving spouse shall be endowed of the third part of all the lands for 
life whereof his or her spouse was seized, of an estate of inheritance, at 
any time during the marriage, unless the endowment shall have been re-
linquished in legal form. 
(b) A person shall have a dower or curtesy right in lands sold in the life-
time of his or her spouse without consent of the spouse in legal form 
against all creditors of the estate.
111 
This portion of the Act addresses two key issues: the allotment of dow-
er when the decedent had children and the concept that dower is superior to 
creditors without the consent of the spouse112 (though a later portion of the 
Act modifies this concept for premarital debts and purchase money debts)113. 
A subsequent portion of the Act deals with situations where the decedent did 
not have children.114 
 
 108. Id. at 124, 161 S.W.2d at 11. 
 109. Id. at 123, 161 S.W.2d at 10. 
 110. See Belt v. Baser, 238 Ark. 644, 648, 383 S.W.2d 657, 659 (1964). 
 111. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-301 (Repl. 2012). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. § 28-11-303 (Repl. 2012). 
 114. See id. § 28-11-307 (Repl. 2012). 
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Adopted children are treated exactly like natural children for the pur-
pose of triggering this portion of the Act.115 A question, though, is whether 
“child or children” extends to grandchildren in the scenario where the dece-
dent leaves no surviving children but leaves grandchildren instead. The Su-
preme Court of Arkansas addressed this issue prior to the current Act and 
determined that grandchildren are treated as children in this scenario.116 The 
Arkansas Court of Appeals addressed this question under the current Act 
and affirmed that grandchildren are still treated as children under this sce-
nario.117 
Per this provision of the Act, if the decedent had issue, then the surviv-
ing spouse’s dower or curtesy interest is limited to one-third of all lands, of 
an estate of inheritance, seized during endowment.118 This provision codifies 
the long-standing common law concept, summarized by the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas as follows: 
Dower at the common law exists where a man seised of an estate of in-
heritance dies in the lifetime of his wife, in which case she is entitled to 
be endowed, during her natural life, of one-third part of all his lands and 
tenements, whereof he was seised at any time during the coverture, and 




There are two critical concepts to determining where the dower vests: 
1. Seisin is required; and 2. The land must be an estate of inheritance.120 
A dower interest vests immediately upon the husband’s death, but only 
to the extent the husband was seised at his death.121 Seisin is a complicated 
topic worthy of its own discussion far larger than the scope of this article.122 
As the Supreme Court of Arkansas once noted, “[a] treatise might be written 
on sufficiency of seisin to sustain dower.”123 An 1876 decision by the court 
described the seising requirement by stating, “[s]eizin is either in deed, or in 
law; seizin in deed, is actual possession; seizin in law, the right to immediate 
possession. Unless such seizin existed during coverture there can be no 
dower, because it is an indispensable requisite to her right to dower, so de-
 
 115. See Sanders v. Taylor, 193 Ark. 1095, 109–99, 104 S.W.2d 797, 798 (1937). 
 116. See Starrett v. McKim, 90 Ark. 520, 522–23, 119 S.W. 824, 825 (1909). 
 117. See GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Farmer, 101 Ark. App. 113, 125, 270 S.W.3d 882, 890 
(2008). 
 118. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-301 (Repl. 2012). 
 119. Arbaugh v. West, 127 Ark. 98, 104, 192 S.W. 171, 173 (1917). 
 120. See id., 192 S.W. at 173. 
 121. Maloney v. McCullough, 215 Ark. 570, 575, 221 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1949). 
 122. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of seisin, see Lynn Foster & J. Cliff 
McKinney, II, Deed Covenants of Title and the Preparation of Deeds: Theory, Law, and 
Practice in Arkansas, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 53, 58 (2011). 
 123. Pfaff v. Heizman, 218 Ark. 201, 204, 235 S.W.2d 551, 552 (1951). 
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clared by statute.”124 The law presumes that a decedent is seized of an estate 
that he or she possesses at death, unless proven otherwise, and possession is 
prima facia evidence of seisin.125 
An estate of inheritance can apply to an equitable estate.126 For in-
stance, in Fletcher v. Felker, the wife was deemed to have a dower interest 
in lands where legal title was in the name of three of her husband’s relatives 
but equitable title remained with her husband.127 Holding an interest as a 
remainderman, though, does not qualify as an estate of inheritance for pur-
poses of dower.128 Likewise, an unvested reversion in land is not a sufficient 
estate for purposes of dower.129 As a matter of law, a spouse does not hold a 
dower or curtesy interest in property held in a life estate.130 
There exists a corollary to this, the concept that a husband cannot by 
any means deprive his wife of her dower interest in any personal property of 
which he is seised at his death, though he may dispose of such assets free of 
her interest at any time during his life.131 The Supreme Court of Arkansas 
faced a unique question in this regard in Hatcher v. Buford.132 Mr. T. A. 
Hatcher gave a substantial amount of bank stock to his nephew while he was 
on his deathbed.133 Mr. Hatcher’s widow asserted a dower interest in the 
stock, even though Mr. Hatcher conveyed it to his nephew during his life-
time, asserting that the stock transfer was a donatio causa mortis.134 The 
court held that title to personal property transferred as a donatio causa mor-
tis does not pass until the moment of death because the gift could be invali-
dated if the donor survives his illness.135 As such, Mr. Hatcher remained 
seized of the stock at his death so his widow’s dower interest attached.136 
The court concluded, 
Under our law, a man may deprive his children of their inheritance by his 
will if he names them. So, also, he may deprive them by a donatio causa 
mortis. But he cannot deprive the widow of her dower rights by either. 
And this for the reason, in both instances, that he dies “seised” of the 
property so conveyed. This, in our opinion, is the only consistent and 
 
 124. Tate v. Jay, 31 Ark. 576, 579 (1876). 
 125. Carnall v. Wilson, 21 Ark. 62, 68 (1860). 
 126. Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F. Supp. 755, 761 (W.D. Ark. 1951); see also Kirby v. Van-
trece, 26 Ark. 368, 370 (1870). 
 127. Fletcher, 97 F. Supp. at 760. 
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logical conclusion; for if the title passes during the donor’s life, and he 
has the absolute right to dispose of his personalty as he pleases, which he 
has, how can it be said that the donee’s rights are inferior to those of the 
widow, except upon the doctrine above enunciated?
137
 
7. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-302. Election Involving 
Exchanged Lands 
The next portion of the Act provides: 
If a person seized of an estate of inheritance in lands exchanges it for 
other lands, the surviving spouse shall not have curtesy or dower of both, 
but shall make an election to curtesy or dower in the lands given or of 
those taken in exchange. If the election is not evinced by the com-
mencement of proceedings to recover curtesy or dower of the lands giv-
en in exchange within one (1) year after the death of the deceased 
spouse, the surviving spouse shall be deemed to have elected to take the 
curtesy or dower of the lands received in exchange.
138
 
There is no case law interpreting this particular portion of the Act. 
8. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-303. Rights Involving 
Mortgaged Land 
A critical portion of the Act deals with the relationship between dower 
rights and the rights of mortgage holders.139 This portion of the Act pro-
vides: 
(a) When a person seized of an estate of inheritance in land shall have 
executed a mortgage of the estate before marriage, the surviving spouse, 
nevertheless, shall be entitled to dower or curtesy out of the lands mort-
gaged as against every person except the mortgagee and those claiming 
under him or her. 
(b)(1) When a person shall purchase lands during coverture and shall 
mortgage his or her estate in the lands to secure the payment of the pur-
chase money, the surviving spouse shall not be entitled to dower or cur-
tesy out of the lands as against the mortgagee or those claiming under 
him or her, although he or she shall not have united in the mortgage. 
However, he or she shall be entitled to dower or curtesy as against all 
other persons. 
 
 137. Id. at 180, 29 S.W. at 644. 
 138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-302 (Repl. 2012). 
 139. Id. § 28-11-303 (Repl. 2012). 
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(2) When, in such a case, the mortgagee or those claiming under him or 
her, shall, after the death of the mortgagor, cause the land mortgaged to 
be sold, either under a power contained in the mortgage or by virtue of 
the decree of a circuit court and any surplus shall remain after the pay-
ment of the moneys due on the mortgage and the costs and charges of 
sale, then the surviving spouse shall be entitled to the interest or income 
of one-third ( ⅓ ) part of the surplus for life, as his or her curtesy or 
dower. 
(c) A surviving spouse shall not be endowed of lands conveyed to the 
deceased spouse by way of mortgage unless the deceased spouse has ac-
quired an absolute estate therein during the marriage.
140 
Somewhat surprisingly, this portion of the Act is also nearly bereft of 
case law interpretation with no cases citing the law in the current form 
adopted by the legislature as part of the Act. Rather, the only references are 
to older versions of the law.141 The Stokes case that is discussed at length 
elsewhere mentions the concept of the mortgage holder’s rights but only in 
the context of the validity of the then-existing version of the law that was 
struck down as unconstitutional because of the disparate treatment of men 
and women.142 
The other case interpreting this provision is the 1937 case of Harris v. 
Mosley.143 In this case, Mr. Gilbert Walker, a widower, delivered a deed of 
trust on eighty acres to secure a $1,435.88 loan.144 About a month after sign-
ing the deed of trust, Mr. Walker married Miss Lucy Ford.145 In 1930, Mr. 
Walker, without his wife’s joinder, increased the indebtedness to $1,935.88 
and extended the term of the loan but did not modify the deed of trust.146 
Mr. Walker died in 1933.147 In 1935, the bank sued to foreclose the lien 
of the deed of trust but did not make the widow or Mr. Walker’s minor son a 
party or serve either with process.148 In 1936, the chancery court granted the 
foreclosure decree but then continued the case until service could be made 
on the minor child.149 The minor child answered the suit through a guardian 
ad litem, but the court ordered the sheriff to dispossess the family from the 
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property.150 Two days later, the widow entered her appearance and the bank 
amended its complaint requesting an order that any dower or homestead 
rights of the widow be foreclosed or barred.151 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas considered the then-current version of 
the statute, which read, “[w]here a person seized of an estate of inheritance 
in land shall have executed a mortgage of such estate before marriage, his 
widow shall nevertheless be entitled to dower out of the lands mortgaged as 
against every person, except the mortgagee and those claiming under 
him.”152 This version of the statute is identical to the current version in sub-
stance, slight wording changes and the inclusion of a husband’s curtesy in-
terest notwithstanding.153 
The court’s decision is somewhat confusing as it also considered a 
statute of limitations issue, but the court held, because the debt was created 
before marriage: 
The widow acquired no rights in the land superior to those of the mort-
gagee, but took whatever rights she had in the land subject to the mort-
gage, and, as against the widow, the mortgagee had a right to foreclose 
the mortgage and bar her dower . . . . Her rights were subject to the 
mortgage existing at the time of the marriage, but any increase in the in-
debtedness secured by the mortgage made after the marriage would be 
void as against her because it is conclusively shown that she did not join 
in the mortgage, and, this being a homestead, no increase in the mort-
gage debt would be binding on her, unless she agreed to it and joined in 
the execution of a mortgage.
154
 
In other words, the bank was superior to the widow as to the original 
$1,435.88 indebtedness but not as to the $500.00 increase made during the 
marriage.155 The court, though, leaves a little doubt as to the outcome in fu-
ture cases with the use of the phrase “this being a homestead” in the last 
sentence of the quoted passage.156 Presumably, this outcome should be the 
same regardless of whether the property is homestead, though the court’s 
phraseology leaves some doubt as to that question. 
Of interesting note, this is the only portion of the Act that still uses the 
archaic term “coverture.”157 Black’s Law Dictionary defines coverture as, 
“[t]he condition of being a married woman <under former law, a woman 
under coverture was allowed to sue only through the personality of her hus-
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band>.”158 An older version of Black’s Law Dictionary added to the defini-
tion, “[s]ometimes used elliptically to describe the legal disability which 
formerly existed at common law from a state of coverture whereby the wife 
could not own property free from the husband’s claim or control.”159 
As part of the clean-up of the dower and curtesy laws necessitated by 
Stokes and Hess, the General Assembly should have used the term “mar-
riage” instead of coverture in (b)(1).160 The General Assembly’s use of a 
term that refers only to women conjures the equal protection concerns of 
Stokes and Hess and could give rise to a challenge. Given, however, the 
General Assembly’s use of the pronouns “his or her” and “him or her,” it 
appears the intent was to be gender neutral so a court would likely overlook 
the archaic term’s literal meaning in favor of a more expansive interpreta-
tion that would preserve the constitutionality of this portion of the Act.161 
9. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-304. Sales of Leases, etc. 
The next provision of the Act provides: 
(a) If a person dies leaving a surviving spouse and a child or children, the 
surviving spouse shall be entitled, absolutely and in his or her own right, 
to one-third ( ⅓ ) of all money received from the sale of timber, oil and 
gas or other mineral leases, oil and gas or other mineral royalty or miner-
al sales, and to one-third ( ⅓ ) of the money derived from any and all 
royalty run to the credit of the royalty owners from any oil or gas well or 
to royalty accruing from the production of other mines or minerals in 
lands in which he or she has a dower, curtesy, or homestead interest, un-
less the surviving spouse shall have relinquished same in legal form. 
(b)(1) All persons, firms, partnerships, or corporations now engaged in 
the production of oil and gas or other minerals shall immediately with-
hold payments to the royalty interests until the rights of the surviving 
spouse are determined, as defined by this section, and shall thereafter 
pay the surviving spouse separately his or her one-third ( ⅓ ) part of all 
royalty accruing to the royalty interest unless he or she shall have relin-
quished the royalty interest in legal form. 
(2) In the sale of timber, the purchaser shall pay one-third ( ⅓ ) of the 
purchase price directly to the surviving spouse or his or her agent or at-
torney at the time of the execution or delivery of the deed.
162 
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This portion of the Act, which dates back to Act 143 of 1945, does not 
have any interpretative case law.163 One analogous issue that has been exam-
ined is applicability of dower and curtesy to growing crops.164 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas addressed this question in the 1872 
case of Street v. Saunders.165 In this case, Mr. John Saunders executed a trust 
deed in favor of Mr. William Street granting Mr. Street security in Mr. 
Saunders’ cotton crop to secure a loan from Mr. Street.166 Mr. Saunders died 
before paying the debt, and his widow asserted a dower interest in the cot-
ton.167 The court concluded that the growing crop of cotton was subject to 
dower rights if the crop belonged to Mr. Saunders at his death.168 The court, 
however, found that the trust deed used in this case to secure the loan actual-
ly conveyed fee ownership of the crop to Mr. Street so Mr. Saunders did not 
have an interest that could be subject to dower.169 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas re-examined this issue in the 1998 
case of Webber v. Webber.170 In this case, Mr. Mark Webber owned farm 
land in Prairie County, Arkansas.171 Mr. Webber deeded the property to his 
five children and reserved a life estate for himself.172 Mr. Webber was mar-
ried at the time of this conveyance, but his wife did not join the deed.173 Mr. 
Webber filed a deed terminating his life estate a few months before his 
death.174 After Mr. Webber’s death, his wife asserted a dower interest in the 
farm land and the crop that was not harvested before he died.175 The court 
affirmed the widow’s dower interest in the farm land because she did not 
join in the execution of the deed as required by Arkansas Code Annotated 
section 28-11-201(a).176 The court also affirmed the widow’s dower rights in 
the crop that was growing at the time of his death.177 
 
 163. See id. 
 164. See Street v. Saunders, 27 Ark. 554, 555 (1872). 
 165. Street, 27 Ark. 554. 
 166. Id. at 555. 
 167. Id. at 555–56. 
 168. Id. at 556. 
 169. Id. at 557. 
 170. Webber v. Webber, 331 Ark. 395, 962 S.W.2d 345 (1998). 
 171. Id. at 397, 962 S.W.2d at 346. 
 172. Id., 962 S.W.2d at 346. 
 173. Id., 962 S.W.2d at 346. 
 174. Id., 962 S.W.2d at 346. 
 175. Id. at 398, 962 S.W.2d at 347. 
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10. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-305. Personal Estate 
The next provision of the Act provides: 
If a person dies leaving a surviving spouse and a child or children, the 
surviving spouse shall be entitled, as part of dower or curtesy in his or 
her own right, to one-third ( ⅓ ) part of the personal estate whereof the 
deceased spouse died seized or possessed.
178
 
Dower rights in personal property did not exist at common law and are 
entirely a creature of statute.179 The Arkansas General Assembly extended 
the common law definition of dower to include personal property very early 
in the state’s history, with case law interpreting the statutory extension of 
the doctrines of dower and curtesy into personal property arising as early as 
1838, just two years after statehood.180 
The major distinction between real and personal property for purposes 
of dower is that a spouse may dispose of his or her personal property with-
out the inchoate dower rights remaining attached to the property even if the 
spouse does not consent to the transfer.181 In other words: 
The wife, by marriage, has no such inchoate right of dower in the per-
sonal estate of her husband as she has in his real estate, and he may sell, 
mortgage or dispose of the same at his pleasure. Her right of dower in his 




This also means that all liens secured by the personal property take 
precedence over the dower interest even if the spouse did not consent to the 
creation of the lien.183 In other words, “the right of dower in personal proper-
ty does not accrue until the decedent’s death; the decedent may sell, mort-
gage or dispose of property at his pleasure.”184 As the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas said in a case involving the validity of a chattel mortgage as 
against a widow, “[h]er [the widow’s] right to dower in his [the husband’s] 
personal estate does not accrue until he dies, and a chattel mortgage execut-
 
 178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-305 (Repl. 2012). 
 179. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 20, 434 S.W.3d 877, 888; Stull v. Gra-
ham, 60 Ark. 461, 476, 31 S.W. 46, 50 (1895). 
 180. See Mayo v. Ark. Valley Trust Co., 132 Ark. 64, 74, 200 S.W. 505, 508 (1917) 
(Smith, J., dissenting); Hill’s Adm’rs v. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 608, 612–13, 614–15 (1844), over-
ruled in part by Menifee’s Adm’rs v. Menifee, 8 Ark. 9 (1847). 
 181. See Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225, 236, 15 S.W. 1026, 1029, modified on reh’g, 55 
Ark. 237, 17 S.W. 873 (1891). 
 182. McClure v. Owens, 32 Ark. 443, 444 (1877). 
 183. Hewitt, 55 Ark. at 236, 15 S.W. at 1029. 
 184. Casey v. Casey, No. CA98-900, 1999 WL 138783, at *6 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 
1999). 
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ed by him in his lifetime remains a valid lien after his death and takes prece-
dence over the widow’s dower.”185 
This seemingly conflicts with the general rule that states, “[t]he surviv-
ing spouse is entitled to dower without deduction for any debts, claims, or 
expense of administration.”186 The key is whether the item of personal prop-
erty at issue was subjected to a lien prior to the decedent’s death as opposed 
to an unsecured debt that might be satisfied out of the personal property. As 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas has said, “dower rights are (in the absence 
of certain special liens) superior to the claims of creditors.”187 Dower “in no 
way conflicts with the rights of the mortgagee or lienholder whose lien is 
prior and paramount to the dower interest in the lands.”188 The foreclosure of 
the lien, however, will not eliminate the dower right if the dower interest is 
prior to the lien.189 
For instance, in a case concerning the priority of a vendor’s lien on per-
sonal property relative to a wife’s dower interest, the Supreme Court of Ar-
kansas held: 
[T]he wife has no separate defense against the vendor’s lien, for, if the 
husband is bound, she is bound too. In other words, the wife has no dow-
er right as against a vendor’s lien under any circumstances, and any de-




Another major distinction between real and personal property for pur-
poses of dower is the concept that personal property is governed by the law 
of the domicile state of the decedent while real property of the decedent is 
governed by the state where the real property is located.191 For example, in 
Gibson v. Dowell, a widow entered an appearance in an ancillary probate 
occurring in an Arkansas court to petition for a dower interest in 
$118,209.03 of her husband’s personal property.192 The administrator of the 
estate objected on the grounds that the decedent was domiciled in Missouri 
at the time of his death.193 The Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected the wid-
ow’s claim, holding: 
But the succession to the personal property of an intestate is regulated by 
the law of his domicile, without regard to the actual situs of the property 
 
 185. McKinney v. Caldwell, 220 Ark. 775, 779, 250 S.W.2d 117, 119 (1952). 
 186. Stevens v. Heritage Bank, 104 Ark. App. 56, 61, 289 S.W.3d 147, 152 (2008). 
 187. Webb v. Smith, 40 Ark. 17, 25 (1882). 
 188. Less v. Less, 131 Ark. 232, 236, 199 S.W. 85, 86 (1917). 
 189. Roetzel v. Beal, 196 Ark. 5, 16, 116 S.W.2d 591, 596 (1938). 
 190. Bothe v. Gleason, 126 Ark. 313, 316, 190 S.W. 562, 563 (1916). 
 191. See Gibson v. Dowell, 42 Ark. 164, 166 (1883). 
 192. Id. at 165. 
 193. Id. at 165 
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at the time of his death. It is considered that movables have no situs, but 
accompany the person of the owner; so that by a legal fiction they are 
always deemed to be in the place of his domicile. And the rights of the 
widow, of heirs and distributees, are determined by the intestate laws of 
the country where the deceased was domiciled.
194
 
When allocating dower, the decedent’s property is divided into two 
classes, real and personal, and the dower interest is applied to each inde-
pendent of the other.195 A deficiency of assets in one class cannot be made 
up out of the other class.196 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has expounded 
on this to say that “the widow is entitled to one-third out of each kind or 
class of personal property of which her husband died seised and pos-
sessed.”197 For purposes of the phrase “seized or possessed” in this part of 
the Act, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has interpreted this to “mean simply 
ownership, which carries with it the actual possession, or a right to the im-
mediate possession.”198 
Notably, this portion of the Act cannot be used to bootstrap a larger cut 
of the husband’s estate for a widow just because the real property of which 
the husband was seised at the time of his death has been converted into per-
sonalty.199 The case of Atkinson v. Van Echaute presented an interesting 
situation where the decedent’s will directed that all real property be sold at 
his death and converted to cash.200 The widow was only entitled to a one-
third life estate in the real property because the decedent had children.201 The 
administrator converted the real property into $4,825.00 cash as directed by 
the will.202 The decedent also had $50.00 in personal property.203 The widow 
then asserted that she was entitled to her one-third dower interest in all of 
the cash held by the administrator.204 The other heirs, however, protested 
saying that her dower interest in the portion of the cash converted from the 
real property should be discounted based on the present value of her life 
estate.205 The Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed with the heirs holding that 
the widow was not entitled to a full one-third share of the cash from the real 
property.206   
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Personal property is held by the administrator of an estate in trust for 
the surviving spouse to the extent of the spouse’s dower or curtesy inter-
est.207 The dower interest includes any interest that is collected on the per-
sonal property between the time of death and the distribution of the assets to 
the widow.208 
11. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-306. Financial Instru-
ments 
The next section of the Act provides: 
If any person shall die leaving a surviving spouse, the surviving spouse 
shall be allowed to take the same dower or curtesy in the bonds, bills, 
notes, books, accounts, and evidences of debt as the surviving spouse 




This section of the Act must be read as a corollary to the previous sec-
tion granting dower in personal property. Dower was limited to real property 
at common law.210 The legislature enlarged the common law early in Arkan-
sas’s statehood to encompass personal property.211 This section clarifies that 
personal property includes bonds, bills, notes, books, accounts and evidenc-
es of debt for purposes of applying dower.212  
This section of the Act would also seem to embrace possible financial 
claims related to a chose in action.213 The case law is particularly conflicting 
in this area.214 In Lee v. Potter, Mr. Charles Potter procured a life insurance 
policy during the life of his second wife.215 The policy designated Mr. Pot-
ter’s then-current wife as the primary beneficiary with his estate as his sec-
ondary beneficiary.216 Mr. Potter remarried after the death of his second 
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2016] DOWER AND CURTESY IN ARKANSAS 379 
wife.217 Mr. Potter’s widow claimed the entire amount of the policy, but the 
trial court awarded her one-third as her dower interest.218 In affirming the 
trial court, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said, “[t]he proceeds of the poli-
cy were clearly a chose in action, and there can be no question that a widow 
is entitled to her dower interest in all choses in action which belong to her 
husband at the time of his death.”219 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas examined the Lee case almost seven-
ty-five years later and decided the right to sue does not arise until after death 
and such a suit can only be brought by the personal representative of the 
deceased.220 In Bridges v. Shields, the court distinguished Lee by saying that 
the life insurance policy at issue in that case could have been changed at any 
time prior to his death, which constituted a chose in action during the dece-
dent’s lifetime.221 The insurance policy in Lee was “due and owing” to the 
estate at the moment of death, and the decedent “had the right to sue on that 
policy” during his lifetime.222 
Even though the court concluded that the trial court reached the right 
result in the wrong way, the court did not expressly repudiate the trial 
court’s position on the question of whether dower applies to a chose in ac-
tion.223 The court said, “[n]evertheless, the circuit court reached the right 
result in denying Bridges’s claim under the dower and curtesy statute. Thus, 
we affirm the order of the circuit court, but we do so for the reason that Ms. 
Frazier never possessed a chose in action.”224 This phraseology is less than 
clear because it could be read as saying that the trial court’s entire analysis 
was incorrect or could be read as merely repudiating the court’s conclusion 
that a wrongful death action constitutes a chose in action. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Arkansas in deciding the Bridges 
case obscured whether dower attaches to a chose in action. The court’s deci-
sion seems to imply that dower applies to a chose in action because the court 
distinguished the decision in Lee on the basis that wrongful death is not a 
chose in action rather than overturning on the basis that dower does not ap-
ply to a chose in action. The confusion, though, arises in the way that the 
court addressed the trial court’s conclusion that dower does not apply to a 
chose in action.225 Earlier in the case, the court recited the trial court’s con-
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clusion that dower does not extend to a chose in action.226 The trial court 
cited two cases for this proposition from the mid-1800s: Hill’s Administra-
tors v. Mitchell and Mulhollan v. Thompson.227 
To help shed some light on this question, it is helpful to look at the two 
mid-1800s cases relied on by the trial court in reaching the conclusion that 
dower does not extend to a chose in action. In the 1844 decision in Hill’s 
Administrators, the court concluded, “[the widow] has no dower in the 
choses in action of her husband, though she has in his money or cash on 
hand.”228 The case, however, was apparently annotated with footnotes by the 
state’s first court reporter, Albert Pike, who added a note at the end of the 
case saying, “[s]he is entitled to dower in the choses in action.”229 In 1853, 
though, in the other case cited by the trial court in Bridges, a different Su-
preme Court of Arkansas case reaffirmed the Hill’s Administrators decision 
with regards to dower’s applicability to a chose in action.230 In Mulhollan, 
the court said a land warrant being claimed by a widow as part of her dower 
“was clearly a chose in action, to which the right of dower did not attach 
within the meaning of our statute, as held by this court in the case of Hill’s 
ad. v. Mitchell et al.”231 
12. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-307. Surviving Spouse 
with No Children 
The next section of the Act provides: 
(a)(1) If a person dies leaving a surviving spouse and no children, the 
surviving spouse shall be endowed in fee simple of one-half ( ½ ) of the 
real estate of which the deceased person died seized when the estate is a 
new acquisition and not an ancestral estate and of one-half ( ½ ) of the 
personal estate, absolutely, and in his or her own right, as against collat-
eral heirs. 
(2) However, as against creditors, the surviving spouse shall be invested 
with one-third ( ⅓ ) of the real estate in fee simple if a new acquisition, 
and not ancestral, and of one-third ( ⅓ ) of the personal property abso-
lutely. 
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(b) If the real estate of the deceased person is an ancestral estate, the sur-
viving spouse shall be endowed in a life estate of one-half ( ½ ) of the es-
tate as against collateral heirs and one-third ( ⅓ ) as against creditors.
232 
This section of the Act is the counterpart to sections 28-11-301 and 
305, for situations where the deceased spouse left no descendants, though it 
is a deviation from the common law that was not recognized in Arkansas 
until 1891.233 In this scenario, the dower or curtesy allocation increases from 
a one-third (1/3) life estate in real property to a one-half (1/2) fee simple 
interest.234 The allocation of personal property also increases from a one-
third (1/3) absolute interest to a one-half (1/2) absolute interest.235 This in-
crease, though, comes with two twists not found in the scenario where the 
decedent leaves behind descendants: (1) A reduction in the dower or curtesy 
interest as against creditors; and (2) The concept of ancestral estates versus 
new acquisitions.236 
The reduction in the dower or curtesy interest as against creditors is 
relatively straightforward. If there is a creditor of the estate and the estate 
lacks sufficient funds to both satisfy the creditor and the dower interest, then 
the dower interest in both real and personal property reduces to a one-third 
(1/3) interest to allow the creditor to take more of the estate.237 
It is more challenging to understand the difference between “ancestral” 
and a “new acquisition” as the statute fails to define either, and many cases 
discussing the concept offer no defining terms.238 When real property is 
classified as ancestral and the deceased spouse had no descendants, then the 
surviving spouse loses all dower or curtesy interest in such property so that 
it can be inherited by the deceased spouse’s blood relations and thereby re-
main in the family.239 The Supreme Court of Arkansas observed: 
The purpose of the statute creating ancestral estates was to keep such es-
tates in the line of the blood from whence they came, and blood must be 
the only consideration by which they are acquired, whether by devise or 
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gift. If the estate is obtained by any means other than descent, gift, or 
gratuitous devise, then it is a new acquisition.
240
 
The significant reduction in the surviving spouse’s estate makes defin-
ing what is “ancestral” critically important.241 Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines “ancestral estate” as, “[a]n estate that is acquired by descent or by op-
eration of law with no other consideration than that of blood.”242 Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “ancestral property” as, “[p]roperty, esp. immovable 
property, that the present owner has acquired from forebears, esp. when the 
owner’s family has held the property for several generations at least.”243 
This second definition would seem to indicate that land would need to have 
been held by multiple successive generations before being considered ances-
tral, though Arkansas courts do not apply this requirement. In fact, it is pos-
sible for land to be classified as ancestral if the ancestor paid all of the con-
sideration but had the land deeded directly to the deceased spouse.244 
For instance, in Barton v. Wilson, the Supreme Court of Arkansas clas-
sified land as an ancestral estate because the deceased spouse inherited from 
his father and does not discuss whether the land had been inherited from 
earlier generations.245 One of the cases that best describes the meaning of an 
ancestral estate is Earl v. Earl.246 In Earl, there was a dispute between the 
widow and the brothers of the decedent over the classification of real prop-
erty as an ancestral estate or a new acquisition.247 Part of the question in this 
case was whether the designation of an ancestral estate traced to property 
acquired from the proceeds of an ancestral estate.248 The court found, “[t]he 
property of the intestate does not possess an ancestral quality where it was 
acquired by the intestate with the proceeds of ancestral property, or where 
the property was acquired by exchanging ancestral property therefor.”249 The 
court also offered this exposition and definition: 
An “ancestral estate” means the identical estate that so comes to the in-
testate, and not an estate that may have been substituted for it. Where a 
child sells the estate which he inherits from his father, or which is given 
to him by his father, he can no longer be said to have the estate which 
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came to him from his ancestor, and the fact that he exchanged that estate 
with his brother for another estate which his brother received from their 
father cannot make any difference.
250
 
Additionally, case law has answered the question of what happens 
when the deceased spouse purchased land from an ancestor or helped pay 
for the acquisition. The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated: 
[I]n order to constitute a gift from a parent to a child an ancestral estate 
within the meaning of our statute, the conveyance must be made entirely 
in consideration of blood and without any consideration deemed valuable 
in law; and, if such deed is executed partly for a valuable consideration, 
the estate acquired is a new acquisition.
251
 
As an example, in Beard v. Beard, a father conveyed land to his son as 
a gift, but the land was encumbered by a mortgage that the son had to satis-
fy.252 The fact that the son had to pay for part of the land converted it from 
being considered an ancestral estate to a new acquisition.253 The Supreme 
Court of Arkansas further stated: 
The fact that the consideration was inadequate or was only in part a con-
sideration for the conveyance does not alter the rule that an estate ac-
quired under such circumstances is a new acquisition. Nor does the fact 
that the grantee had not in fact paid the consideration affect the applica-




13. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-401. Erecting a Jointure 
The next section of the Act provides: 
(a) When an estate in land shall be conveyed to a person and his or her 
intended spouse, or to the intended spouse alone, or to any person in trust 
for the person and his or her intended spouse, or in trust for the spouse 
alone, for the purpose of erecting a jointure for the intended spouse, and 
with his or her assent, the jointure shall be a bar to any right or claim for 
dower or curtesy of the spouse in any land of the other spouse. 
(b) The assent of the spouse to the jointure shall be evinced, if he or she 
is of full age, by his or her becoming a party to the conveyance by which 
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it shall be settled or, if the spouse is an infant, by his or her joining with 
his or her father or guardian in the conveyance. 
(c) Any pecuniary provision that shall be made for the benefit of an in-
tended spouse, and in lieu of dower or curtesy, if assented to by the in-
tended spouse, as provided in this section, shall be a bar to any right or 




Understanding this section, and the following sections of the Act, re-
quires an understanding of the term “jointure,” which is not in common le-
gal usage today. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “jointure” as: 
jointure (joyn-chər) (15c) 1. Archaic. A woman’s freehold life estate in 
land, made in consideration of marriage in lieu of dower and to be en-
joyed by her only after her husband’s death; a settlement under which a 
wife receives such an estate. • The four essential elements are that (1) the 
jointure must take effect immediately upon the husband’s death, (2) it 
must be for the wife’s own life, and not for another’s life or for a term of 
years, (3) it must be held by her in her own right and not in trust for her, 
and (4) it must be in lieu of her entire dower. See dower.                          
- equitable jointure (1803) A premarital arrangement for a woman to 
enjoy a jointure, accepted by the woman in lieu of dower. — Also 
termed equitable dower. 
2. A settlement under which a wife receives such an estate. — Also 
termed legal jointure. 
3. An estate in lands given jointly to a husband and wife before they 
marry. See JOINTRESS.
256 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas offered this definition of jointure: 
“[j]ointure is defined to be ‘a competent livelihood of freehold for the wife 
of lands and tenements, to take effect in profit and possession presently after 
the death of the husband, for the life of the wife at least.’”257 Put as simply 
as possible, a jointure is a payment or gift to a spouse that, if accepted, bars 
the spouse’s dower or curtesy rights.258 
To understand this section, it is also necessary to be mindful of the 
common law principle that: 
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Marriage, in the eye of the law, is held to be a valuable consideration, 
and the wife is regarded as a purchaser for a valuable consideration of all 
property which accrued to her by virtue of her marital rights . . . . Not on-




There must be real consideration given to the spouse for the jointure to 
be valid.260 For instance, in McGaugh v. Mathis, a man was alleged to have 
two wives and his first wife asserted a dower interest.261 The court, however, 
found that the first wife had entered into a separation agreement and accept-
ed a deed from her husband in lieu of dower, which acted as a jointure bar-
ring any potential claim to dower by this purported wife.262 
In some situations, a court may apply an “equitable jointure.”263 This 
was the situation in one of the most important jointure cases, Comstock v. 
Comstock.264 In Comstock, Mr. R. Comstock and Ms. Ella Babb, both of 
whom had children from previous marriages, entered into a prenuptial 
agreement containing the following clause: 
The said Ella Babb in lieu of dower and widow’s right agrees to take that 
part of the estate which each child shall inherit, counting herself as a 
child, except as to homestead, only what is known as a child’s part as her 
dowry of R. Comstock’s estate should he die first.
265
 
The spouses separated after approximately five years of marriage after 
they decided it was “impossible to live peaceably and quietly together.”266 
Mr. Comstock paid his wife $2,000 upon their separation, though the 
reason for the payment was hotly disputed during the ensuing case.267 Mr. 
Comstock sued his wife after she refused to join a deed to release her dower 
claiming that the payment he made upon their separation should serve as a 
jointure.268 The case involved conflicting testimony over the intent of the 
$2,000 payment, but the court ultimately believed Mr. Comstock’s version, 
which was that the $2,000 was intended as a jointure.269 The fact that $2,000 
was equal to the portion of Mr. Comstock’s estate that Mrs. Comstock was 
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entitled to receive upon his death under the prenuptial agreement based on 
his then-current net worth particularly impressed the court to side with his 
version.270 The court found that this arrangement was not technically a join-
ture, but “was nevertheless intended by the parties as a provision . . . in lieu 
of dower.”271 Accordingly, the court found that the contract operated as an 
equitable jointure.272 
14. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-402. Election Involving 
Jointure 
The next provision of the Act provides: 
If, before the marriage, but without a spouse’s assent, or if, after the mar-
riage, land shall be given or assured for the jointure of a spouse or a pe-
cuniary provision shall be made for the spouse in lieu of dower or curte-
sy, the spouse shall make an election whether the spouse will take the 
jointure or pecuniary provision, or whether the spouse will be endowed 




This portion of the Act has no case law discussing it. This portion is, 
however, closely tied to the previous provision. This portion of the Act so-
lidifies the concept that a jointure can be made in lieu of dower, but the 
spouse has the right to elect dower in lieu of the offered alternative proper-
ty.274 
15. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-403. Election Involving 
Land, and Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-404. Devise in 
Lieu of Dower or Curtesy 
The next two sections of the Act must be considered together both be-
cause of their effect and their treatment in case law, which is usually to con-
sider both sections together. The sections provide as follows: 
If land is devised to a spouse, or a pecuniary or other provision is made 
for a spouse by will in lieu of dower or curtesy, the spouse shall make an 
election whether he or she will take the land so devised, or the provision 
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If any spouse shall devise and bequeath to the other spouse any portion 
of his or her real estate of which he or she died seized, it shall be deemed 
and taken in lieu of dower or curtesy, as the case may be, out of the es-
tate of the deceased spouse, unless the testator shall, in his or her will, 
declare otherwise.
276 
These sections allow a spouse to provide a bequest in lieu of dower or 
curtesy but give the surviving spouse the option to elect against such a de-
vise and take dower or curtesy instead.277 The Supreme Court of Arkansas 
has consistently interpreted this section in light of a guiding common law 
principle, that is: 
Under the common law, the testator will not be presumed to have intend-
ed a devise in his will to be a substitute for dower unless the claim of 
dower would be inconsistent with the will, or so repugnant to its provi-
sions as to disturb and defeat the will. In other words, at common law it 
is held that, where the testator’s intention was not apparent upon the will, 
the devise would be presumed to be in addition to dower. 
. . . . 
. . . [I]f a husband shall devise to his wife any portion of his real estate of 
which he dies seized, it shall be taken in lieu of dower out of the estate of 
such deceased husband unless such testator shall, in his will, declare oth-
erwise. It will be noted that there is no such provision in our statutes with 
regard to personal property. The will under consideration bequeaths per-
sonal property and also contains a devise of real estate. It has been held 
under statutes like that just referred to above that a legacy of personal 
property will not put the widow to her election as in the case of a devise 
of real estate unless expressly made in lieu of dower.
278 
This principle can result in the need for a facts and circumstances anal-
ysis to determine the devising spouse’s intent in the will, or, as the court has 
said in cases under this section of the Act, “[e]ach case must be determined 
upon its own circumstances.”279 For instance, in U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
Edmondson, the devising spouse left his estate in trust for the benefit of his 
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wife during her lifetime with the residuary to go to the Catholic Church up-
on her death.280 The couple had no children, and the wife was in “delicate 
health” and had previously been adjudicated insane.281 In deciding that the 
bequest was intended to be in lieu of dower, the court considered that the 
couple had no children, that the real estate was not ancestral, that the will 
was “a very carefully prepared instrument,” and that the husband had made 
“ample provision for the support of his wife.”282 
If the surviving spouse elects against the will to take dower instead, the 
will is deemed “destroyed” as to the surviving spouse.283 The surviving 
spouse then takes as if the deceased spouse had died intestate.284 An elec-
tion, once made, is generally irrevocable absent a fraud upon the electing 
spouse.285 
16. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 28-11-405. Conditions for For-
feiture 
The final provision of the Act provides: 
Every jointure, devise, and pecuniary provision, in lieu of dower or cur-
tesy, shall be forfeited by the spouse for whose benefit it shall be made, 
in the same cases in which the spouse would forfeit his or her dower or 
curtesy, as the case may be. Upon such a forfeiture, any estate so con-
veyed for jointure and every pecuniary provision so made shall immedi-
ately vest in the person, or his or her legal representatives, in whom they 
would have vested on the determination of the spouse’s interest therein 
by the death of the spouse.
286
 
This provision comes into play in situations such as those described in 
Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-11-204, and discussed in much greater 
detail in a previous section of this article. In other words, a jointure or de-
vise in lieu of dower is void in the same circumstances where a dower or 
curtesy is void. 
Interestingly, the only case citing this particular section of the Act deals 
with an alleged wrongful death, though that is not the context where the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas cited this statute.287 In Pickens v. Black, the 
children of the deceased husband raised numerous defenses to the husband’s 
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third wife taking an interest in his estate.288 Among these was the argument 
that the widow was culpable in the husband’s death “by neglecting him, 
depriving him of medical treatment, and allowing him to overdose himself 
on morphine.”289 The court dismissed this contention noting that, in the final 
three days of his life, the widow took the husband to the doctor twice, called 
a doctor for consultation once and brought a doctor to the house twice.290 
The court did not cite this portion of the Act in discussing the culpability 
claim, but the court cited it in a different scenario.291 Specifically, the court 
described how the deceased husband’s father had bequeathed land to the 
deceased’s mother as a life estate with the deceased to take in fee simple 
upon his mother’s death.292 The deceased’s mother, however, had elected 
against the will to take her dower interest, thus causing the deceased’s re-
mainder interest to vest immediately upon his mother’s election.293 The court 
cited this section of the Act to support this interpretation, though the court 
provided no explanation to further elucidate the application of the statute to 
this situation.294 
V. SPECIAL COMMON LAW ISSUES 
Dower and curtesy case law and precedent span nearly a millennium, 
so there is consequently a seemingly endless array of common law legal 
principles in existence. It would require a book to explore all of the potential 
issues and precedents, so just a few are explored below to give a feel for the 
variety of issues that come up in this area of the law. 
A. Dower’s Characteristics as an Interest in Real Estate 
As the Supreme Court of Arkansas has noted, “[t]he inchoate right of 
dower during the life-time of [the spouse] is not an estate in land.”295 In oth-
er words, a dower interest, in both real and personal property, remains in-
choate or contingent, until the spouse’s death.296 
A dower interest in real estate includes all lands, tenements and here-
ditaments.297 A dower interest can give a party standing in a suit for refor-
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mation of a deed.298 Dower is not a transferrable right, though it can be 
waived or relinquished.299 A life estate created by dower may be sold and 
conveyed just like any other estate in land.300 Possession of property by a 
widow entitled to dower can lead to adverse possession against the heirs.301 
The law views the contingent dower or curtesy interest of a spouse as 
an encumbrance on the title of the spouse seized of an estate.302 A married 
person may relinquish his or her dower or curtesy interest by joining the 
spouse in any deed.303 A dower interest is subject to the statute of frauds and 
cannot be released except in writing.304 When a spouse joins a conveyance to 
release dower or curtesy, the spouse is effectively only releasing his or her 
encumbrance on the land.305 Consequently, the grantee must look only to the 
grantor for defects in title.306 
If the wife does not join the deed, then the principle is, “where the wife 
does not join in the conveyance the grantee of such conveyance or lease 
takes title burdened with the dower interest of the wife.”307 In the case of 
Webb v. Smith, Mr. Robert Tweedy died on April 6, 1870, leaving a wid-
ow.308 Nearly ten years after his death, the administrator of Mr. Tweedy’s 
estate sold land belonging to Mr. Tweedy to satisfy debts of the estate.309 
The administrator was granted permission by the probate court to sell the 
land free of the widow’s dower interest with her share of the proceeds to be 
paid to her after the sale.310 The widow challenged the sale on the basis that 
her dower interest was not presented to the probate court for adjudication 
when the administrator applied for permission to conduct the sale.311 The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed that the probate court improperly or-
dered the land sold without preserving the widow’s dower interest.312 Even 
though a third-party purchased the land at the sale, the court held that the 
buyer purchased subject to the widow’s dower right.313 The court held that it 
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was immaterial that the buyer would have paid less had he known that the 
dower interest remained, stating: 
It was not the fault of the [widow], who was not personally a party to the 
order, and in no way to blame, or responsible for the form in which it 
was made. [The buyer] bid at his peril, and if he mistook the law it was 
his own fault and misfortune.
314
 
B. Divorce and Adultery 
To be entitled to dower or curtesy, the parties must be married at the 
time of death.315 Dower or curtesy is barred if the parties divorce prior to 
death.316 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas disagreed with the common law con-
cept that a wife who divorced her husband because of his acts of adultery 
might continue to retain the right of dower, holding instead that a divorce, 
regardless of cause, terminates dower rights.317 In deciding this question, the 
Supreme Court of Arkansas examined the New York case of Wait v. Wait 
where the New York court interpreted common law as preserving dower in 
the case of a husband’s adultery.318 The court found that the existence of 
alimony laws was sufficient to compensate a wronged wife without giving 
the ex-wife a continuing inchoate dower right.319 
At common law, a wife who committed adultery forfeited her dower 
rights.320 Her rights were only restored if the husband, without coercion from 
the church, willingly reconciled with her and allowed her to remain living 
with him.321 This meant that the act of adultery could not have been con-
cealed from the husband because it took an act of knowing, willing reconcil-
iation to restore the wife’s dower rights after the act of adultery.322 Conse-
quently, those who might benefit from the defeat of a wife’s dower, such as 
a third-party purchasers of land who might be dispossessed by the dower, 
would be incentivized to “bring to public investigation scandals which those 
most interested had preferred to bury, or to pass unnoticed.”323 
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The Supreme Court of Arkansas decided in the rather salacious case of 
Grober v. Clements that adultery in the absence of divorce does not termi-
nate dower.324 In Grober, Wilhelmina Clements, aged 35, married John 
Grober, aged 80.325 Wilhelmina and John lived together for approximately 
four years before separating.326 John twice attempted to divorce Wilhelmina 
but failed both times, the first for want of equity and the second for failure 
to obtain service on his inconstant wife.327 Wilhelmina married another man 
in St. Louis a few months before John’s death at age 95.328 The court was 
unable to satisfactorily determine if Wilhelmina intentionally committed 
adultery and bigamy in her new marriage because she gave unclear testimo-
ny whether she believed herself to be divorced from John or believed him to 
be dead at the time of her new marriage.329 The court, though, found it to be 
irrelevant whether Wilhelmina committed adultery, knowingly or other-
wise.330 Despite the protests of John’s children by a previous marriage, the 
court awarded dower rights to Wilhelmina finding that Arkansas did not 
recognize the common law concept forfeiting dower in cases of adultery.331 
Further, the court found that Wilhelmina was entitled to dower even if she 
believed herself divorced from John and that only an actual legal divorce 
would terminate dower.332 
The decision in Grober echoes in the more recent case of Hamilton v. 
Hamilton.333 In Hamilton, Barrett Hamilton, who had two adult daughters 
from a previous marriage, and Virginia Hamilton filed for divorce in 
1990.334 Mr. Barrett Hamilton died during the pendency of the divorce.335 
Mr. Hamilton’s daughters challenged the wife’s attempt to elect against the 
will and claim her elective share, including dower, arguing, among other 
bases, that Mr. Hamilton was estranged from his wife and in the process of 
obtaining a divorce.336 The court concluded that the relationship between the 
spouses was irrelevant because “the parties were still married under our laws 
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when Hamilton died” and “[h]is widow’s election to take against his will 
was appropriate, the pending divorce action notwithstanding.”337 
C. Attempts to Defeat a Spouse’s Interest 
One of the most recent and important dower cases in Arkansas is In re 
Estate of Thompson because it held that nonprobate assets are subject to the 
elective share under certain circumstances.338 This case has now created 
significant uncertainty in this area of the law, leaving major unanswered 
questions about what nonprobate assets may be subject to dower and curte-
sy.339 In Estate of Thompson, Anne Thompson elected against the will of her 
husband, Ripley Thompson.340 In 2009, the decedent amended his inter vivos 
trust and his will to effectively eliminate his wife from his estate.341 The 
decedent funded his trust with approximately $5.8 million and left his estate 
with $230,471 in personal property.342 Mrs. Thompson sued seeking to in-
validate the will or, in the alternative, elect against the will with the addi-
tional claim that her elective share, including dower, should include the as-
sets of the trust.343 After a trial, the circuit court determined that Mr. Thomp-
son’s 2009 will and trust deprived his wife of her marital rights to his prop-
erty.344 The circuit court determined that Mrs. Thompson was entitled to 
elect against the will and to include the trust estate within her elective 
share.345 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas recognized a settled princi-
pal: 
[U]pon a settlor’s death, title to property held in an inter vivos revocable 
trust becomes irrevocable, such that, regardless of the nature of the rights 
retained over the assets by the settlor during his lifetime, the property 
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The court concluded that the principal of a trust becoming irrevocable 
might be overruled for certain limited purposes when equity dictates.347 To 
support this, the court cited the countervailing principal: 
The general rule is that if a man or woman convey away his or her prop-
erty for the purpose of depriving the intended husband or wife of the le-
gal rights and benefits arising from such marriage, equity will avoid such 
conveyance, or compel the person taking it to hold the property in trust 
for or subject to the rights of the defrauded husband or wife.
348
 
The court also asserted a long-standing principal to zealously protect “a 
spouse’s marital rights in property, even when a spouse’s assertion of those 
rights is contrary to a testator’s right to control the distribution of his proper-
ty upon his death.”349 The court acknowledged that the issue of extending 
the spouse’s elective share to encompass a trust corpus in the case of a fraud 
was a case of first impression.350 The court found the decedent’s act in this 
situation constituted a fraud on the wife’s marital rights.351 The finding of 
fraud justified a limited exception to the general principal to allow the 
spouse’s elective share to include the assets of the trust.352 
To address the appellant’s objections, the court acknowledged the prin-
cipal announced in the case of Estate of Dahlmann v. Estate of Dahlmann 
that a testator “can devise his property however he chooses and can exclude 
or disinherit his spouse.”353 The court, though, pointed out that Estate of 
Dahlmann did not prevent the spouse from asserting her elective share in-
cluding dower.354 In Estate of Dahlmann, the court stated, “[a] spouse has 
the right to make a will which excludes a surviving spouse.”355 However, 
“[t]hat a surviving spouse may take against a will prevents any injustice that 
might result from the spouse’s exercise of that right.”356 The court in Estate 
of Thompson interpreted Estate of Dahlmann to permit spousal disinher-
itance, but subject to the spouse’s nearly absolute right to elect against the 
will and claim the elective share.357 
 
 347. Id. at 9, 434 S.W.3d at 882. 
 348. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 882 (quoting West v. West, 120 Ark. 500, 504, 179 S.W. 1017, 
1018 (1915)). 
 349. Id. at 10, 434 S.W.3d at 883. 
 350. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 883. 
 351. Id. at 7, 434 S.W.3d at 881. 
 352. Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 9, 434 S.W.3d at 882. 
 353. Id. at 15–16, 434 S.W.3d at 885–86 (citing Estate of Dahlmann v. Estate of Dahl-
mann, 282 Ark. 296, 298, 668 S.W.2d 520, 521 (1984). 
 354. Id. at 16, 434 S.W.3d at 886. 
 355. Estate of Dahlmann, 282 Ark. at 298, 668 S.W.2d at 521. 
 356. Id., 668 S.W.2d at 521. 
 357. Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 16, 434 S.W.3d at 886. 
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The court’s decision in Estate of Thompson drew a dissent from Justic-
es Baker and Hart with the dissent authored by Justice Hart.358 Justice Hart 
summarized her position by making the following statements: 
The majority holds that the assets of a revocable trust should be included 
in a decedent’s estate for the purpose of calculating the elective spousal 
share. Because this holding is contrary to established Arkansas probate 




Justice Hart pointed out, “[d]ower in personalty is a creature of statute 
because, at common law, it attached only to real estate.”360 As a creature of 
statute, Justice Hart felt that the spouse’s right to assert her elective share 
should be subservient to the plain language of the statute that the dower 
right vests only in the personal property held at death, which would not in-
clude the personalty in the trust.361 Justice Hart felt that the majority’s deci-
sion was so broad that “any transfer of personalty to a person other than the 
spouse would compel the conclusion that the spouse was defrauded by the 
transfer and deprived of her marital rights.”362 Justice Hart opined that she 
interpreted the majority’s decision as extending to “any property or accounts 
held in pay on death, transfer on death, or co-ownership registration with the 
right of survivorship, as well as in the proceeds of insurance over which the 
decedent held an exercisable general power of appointment.”363 
D. Allotment of Dower and Curtesy 
A widow entitled to dower does not make her an “heir.”364 The heirs at 
law of a deceased spouse have a duty to allot dower to the widow.365 A wid-
ow does not have a duty to demand her dower as she may presume it will be 
preserved for her benefit.366 The failure of the heirs to honor their duty to 
allot the dower does not start the statute of limitations against a widow to 
 
 358. Id. at 19, 434 S.W.3d at 888 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 359. Id. at 19–20, 434 S.W.3d at 888 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 360. Id. at 20, 434 S.W.3d at 888 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 361. Id. at 21, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 362. Id. at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 363. Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). 
 364. Sanders v. Taylor, 193 Ark. 1095, 1098, 104 S.W.2d 797, 798 (1937). 
 365. Maxwell v. Awtrey, 151 Ark. 85, 89, 235 S.W. 384, 385 (1921); see also Brinkley v. 
Taylor, 111 Ark. 305, 308, 163 S.W. 521, 522 (1914). 
 366. See Trimble v. James, 40 Ark. 393, 405 (1883). 
396 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
assert her dower rights.367 The widow has “a right to sue for and compel the 
setting aside to her of her dower interest until it has been assigned.”368 
The devisees of an estate are necessary parties to any proceedings for 
the allotment of dower.369 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held, “[i]n 
allotting dower it is not proper to deduct the homestead and assign the dow-
er out of the remainder of the estate; the widow is entitled to dower in the 
whole estate.”370 The court has also held, “[w]hen a probate court finds the 
land cannot be divided in kind to effectuate dower rights, it may order the 
property rented and the rental divided, or it may order the property sold and 
the proceeds divided.”371 
E. Special Lien and Foreclosure Considerations 
A foreclosure decree does not terminate a spouse’s dower or curtesy 
rights unless rights are specifically made an issue in the foreclosure case.372 
The widow does not have equity of redemption, but her dower right is par-
amount to the title of the mortgagee in some instances.373 In the case of fore-
closure sales by the state for non-payment of taxes, dower will be lost after 
the redemption.374 A dower interest can supersede federal tax liens in some 
situations.375 
As a general rule: 
Title to real estate of an intestate vests in his heirs at law upon his death, 
subject to the widow’s dower and sale for payment of debts, preservation 
or protection of assets of the estate, the distribution of the estate or any 
other purpose in the best interest of the estate.
376
 
The widow’s dower interest is “subject to the payment of a just propor-
tion of the indebtedness.”377 A widow has no right to direct an executor to 
redeem land subject to a lien.378 The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held: 
 
 367. Webb v. Smith, 40 Ark. 17, 23–24 (1882); see also Brinkley, 111 Ark. at 308, 163 
S.W. at 522. 
 368. Bradham v. United States, 287 F. Supp. 10, 16 (W.D. Ark. 1968). 
 369. Jameson v. Davis, 124 Ark. 399, 402–03, 187 S.W. 314, 315 (1916). 
 370. Horton v. Hilliard, 58 Ark. 298, 303, 24 S.W. 242, 244 (1893). 
 371. Webber v. Webber, 331 Ark. 395, 399, 962 S.W.2d 345, 348 (1998). 
 372. See Fourche River Lumber Co. v. Walker, 96 Ark. 540, 545, 132 S.W. 451, 453 
(1910). 
 373. See McWhirter v. Roberts, 40 Ark. 283, 287 (1883). 
 374. See id. at 289. 
 375. Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Kosin, 2011 Ark. 51, 13, 378 S.W.3d 135, 143. 
 376. Rice v. Seals, 2010 Ark. App. 393, 6–7, 377 S.W.3d 416, 422. 
 377. Less v. Less, 147 Ark. 432, 437, 227 S.W. 763, 764 (1921). 
 378. Hewitt v. Cox, 55 Ark. 225, 234, 15 S.W. 1026, 1029 (1981), modified on reh’g, 55 
Ark. 237, 17 S.W. 873 (1891). 
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Under the statutes of this state the real and personal property of the es-
tates of deceased persons are made assets in the hands of the executor or 
administrator for the payment of debts. The widow has no right to direct 
how any of the debts shall be paid.”
379
 
The court has further held, “dower lands may be sold to satisfy the lien 
for the sum contributed by the heirs to pay the mortgage indebtedness on 
them.”380 
F. Authority of the Legislature to Change Dower and Curtesy Laws 
A significant question is to what extent a legislative change is retroac-
tive. The Supreme Court of Arkansas established well over a century ago 
that a widow is entitled to dower in accordance with the law at the time of 
the death of her husband rather than at the time of marriage.381 The seminal 
case in Arkansas on this issue is Skelly Oil Co. v. Murphy.382 In Skelly Oil, 
Mr. and Mrs. Oscar Murphy of Union County married in 1888 while both 
were still minors.383 Mr. Oscar Murphy owned 80 acres at the time of both 
his marriage and his minority.384 Less than two months after their marriage, 
Oscar’s father, acting on Oscar’s behalf, conveyed 80 acres to Skelly Oil 
Company’s successor in interest.385 Neither Oscar nor his wife signed the 
deed.386 
Mrs. Murphy remained married to Oscar until his death in 1927.387 Af-
ter his death, she asserted her dower interest in the eighty acres, which were 
producing significant revenue from oil production.388 The legislature, how-
ever, had passed a law in 1923 dissolving a wife’s inchoate dower interest 
fifteen years after an interest is conveyed to a third-party.389 Because the 
conveyance of the disputed land occurred more than fifteen years before Mr. 
Murphy’s death, the question before the court was whether the legislature 
had the ability to retroactively limit Mrs. Murphy’s inchoate dower rights 
she received when she married in 1888.390 
 
 379. Id. at 232, 15 S.W. at 1028. 
 380. Less v. Less, 158 Ark. 255, 262, 249 S.W. 583, 584 (1923). 
 381. See Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 180–81, 29 S.W. 641, 644 (1895). 
 382. Skelly Oil Co. v. Murphy, 180 Ark. 1023, 24 S.W.2d 314 (1930). 
 383. Id. at 1024, 24 S.W.2d at 314. 
 384. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 314. 
 385. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 314. 
 386. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 314. 
 387. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 314. 
 388. See Skelly Oil, 180 Ark. at 1024, 24 S.W.2d at 314. 
 389. Id. at 1025, 24 S.W.2d at 315. 
 390. Id. at 1026, 24 S.W.2d at 315. 
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The court held “that before the death of a husband, and while the right 
of dower is inchoate, it is subject to legislative control and may be enlarged, 
diminished, or abolished by the Legislature.”391 The court justified this posi-
tion by saying, “[t]he reason for the rule is that, since the wife’s right of 
dower is not a vested right in property, it is not protected from legislative 
impairment or destruction by the constitutional guaranties for the protection 
of property.”392 The court then observed: 
Dower is not a right based on contract, but one resulting from wedlock 
as an incident to it, and as a matter of social and domestic policy. There-
fore the right to dower results from operation of law, and is not an im-




The court justified its decision primarily through citing three cases: 
State v. Boney, Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co. and Tatum v. Tatum.394 
In State v. Boney, the court examined the authority of the state legisla-
ture to impose an inheritance tax on property taken through dower.395 In 
upholding the legislature’s power to impose such a tax, the court summa-
rized the law as follows: 
[D]ower is not regarded as springing from contract, although the contract 
or marriage is a prerequisite to its existence, but is a right, the existence, 
nature and extent of which is subject to legislative control. The estate of 
dower appears to be as old as the common law; but so also is the right of 
an heir to inherit from an ancestor; and the lawmaking power possesses 
as plenary control over the one as it has over the other. The Legislature 
has the right to change the law of dower and has done so more than once, 
usually by enlarging the common-law right of dower. The Legislature as 
certainly has the right to diminish or to abolish dower, and as the right to 
take dower is a privilege which the Legislature may give or may with-
hold as it pleases, it follows that, in granting the right, the Legislature 
may impose a tax for governmental purposes upon the exercise of the 
right or privilege against the person to whom it is given.
396
 
The case of Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co. was a Supreme Court of 
the United States case that examined the question of whether dower or cur-
tesy enjoyed any constitutional protections.397 The Court concluded: 
 
 391. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 315. 
 392. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 315. 
 393. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 315. 
 394. Skelly Oil, 180 Ark. at 1026–27, 24 S.W.2d at 315. 
 395. See State v. Boney, 156 Ark. 169, 177, 245 S.W. 315, 315 (1922). 
 396. Id. at 177–78, 245 S.W. at 317. 
 397. Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 258 U.S. 314, 318 (1922). 
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Dower is not a privilege or immunity of citizenship, either state or feder-
al, within the meaning of the provisions relied on. At most it is a right 
which, while it exists, is attached to the marital contract or relation, and 
it always has been deemed subject to regulation by each state as respects 
property within its limits.
398
 
The third case, Tatum v. Tatum, is a little harder to understand as cited 
by the court in Skelly Oil.399 The court in Skelly Oil described Tatum as fol-
lows: 
[I]n Tatum . . . the court recognized that the wife’s inchoate right of 
dower is not a vested right in the sense that it is not subject to change or 
even abolishment by the Legislature so long as it is contingent, but held 
that it could not be divested by any act of the husband, and on that ac-
count it was a valuable right which the law would recognize and protect. 
It necessarily results that, since the right of dower does not exist by vir-
tue of contract but by operation of law, the obligation of a contract is not 
impaired by the modification of the law which governs it.
400
 
The Tatum case, however, does not mention the legislature or the gen-
eral assembly at any point.401 The Tatum case concerned the question of 
whether a wife with an inchoate dower interest could force a mineral lessee 
to impound a portion of the oil being produced to avoid overly diminishing 
the value of her potential future estate.402 In the case, Mary Jane Tatum’s 
husband, Albert Tatum sold his one-fifth undivided interest in real property 
to Lizzie Minor without his wife’s consent.403 Lizzie Minor then sold the 
property to other parties who commenced drilling oil from the property.404 
Mrs. Tatum sued her husband and the current property owners alleging that 
the drilling activities were diminishing the value of her inchoate interest in 
the property.405 
The Tatum Court used public policy to guide its decision because it 
recognized this as a very unique issue with extremely limited case law and 
no controlling authority.406 The court stated that it is the “public policy” of 
the Supreme Court of Arkansas to treat dower as “a favorite of the law.”407 
The court said, “[h]er [dower] interest or right—whatever it may be—is 
 
 398. Id. 
 399. See Skelly Oil, 180 Ark. at 1027–28, 24 S.W.2d at 315 (citing Tatum v. Tatum, 174 
Ark. 110, 295 S.W. 720 (1927)). 
 400. Id., 24 S.W.2d at 315. 
 401. See Tatum v. Tatum, 174 Ark. 110, 295 S.W. 720 (1927). 
 402. Id. at 110, 295 S.W. at 720. 
 403. See id., 295 S.W. at 720. 
 404. Id., 295 S.W. at 720. 
 405. Id., 295 S.W. at 720. 
 406. See id. at 113, 295 S.W. at 720, 721. 
 407. Tatum, 174 Ark. at 113, 295 S.W. at 721. 
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something of value, and is entitled to protection, if it can be done consistent-
ly with the principles of equity.”408 The court held, “[a]fter a careful consid-
eration of the whole matter, the majority of us are of the opinion that the 
inchoate right of dower is more nearly like the interest of a contingent re-
mainderman who may be protected by impounding the funds in cases like 
this.”409 The court said: 
Where the husband opens up mines on his own land and works them 
himself, the law would presume that his wife consented to his action, and 
was enjoying the benefits which he might obtain. In the case at bar, the 
wife refused to relinquish her dower in the land, and this of necessity af-
fected the price thereof. Her inchoate right of dower, by whatever name 
called, necessarily affected the price to be paid, because it would be con-
summate upon the death of her husband. Thus it will be seen that, if the 
husband can convey his land without relinquishment of dower on the 
part of his wife, and his grantees can open up mines, and work them to 
extinction, a valuable right or interest of the wife is destroyed. It is no 
answer to say that she will be entitled to dower in the land if she outlives 
her husband. It is easy to imagine cases where the lands would have no 
value whatever except for the oil, gas, or other minerals contained in 
them. The exhaustion of the minerals from the land would leave them of 
little or no practical value.
410
 
Even with the seeming disconnect in the Skelly Oil court’s interpreta-
tion of the Tatum case, the court nevertheless cited abundant authority for its 
ultimate conclusion that dower and curtesy exist at the whim of the legisla-
ture.411 The Supreme Court of Arkansas later summarized the Skelly Oil 
provision as standing for the proposition, “[t]he legislature has the power to 
give or withhold dower, and it has the power to declare the manner in which 
the dower right might be barred.”412 
G. Valuing a Life Estate 
There are many instances where a spouse may receive a life estate in-
terest through dower or curtesy. This raises the question about how to value 
the life estate. The two Dowell v. Dowell cases provide the key for valuing 
life estates, though they are not dower or curtesy cases.413 As discussed be-
 
 408. Id. at 112, 295 S.W. at 721. 
 409. Id. at 113, 295 S.W. at 721. 
 410. Id. at 113–14, 295 S.W. at 721. 
 411. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Murphy, 180 Ark. 1023, 24 S.W.2d 314 (1930). 
 412. In re Estate of Epperson, 284 Ark. 35, 38, 679 S.W.2d 792, 793 (1984). 
 413. Dowell v. Dowell, 207 Ark. 578, 182 S.W.2d 344 (1944); Dowell v. Dowell, 209 
Ark. 175, 189 S.W.2d 797 (1945). 
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low, the General Assembly has also provided a statute to guide the valua-
tion. 
In Dowell, the question was how to value a wife’s life estate.414 Mrs. 
Lillie Dowell sued her husband, Mr. Lewis Dowell, for divorce on the 
grounds of cruel and harsh treatment and his conviction of a felony.415 The 
husband answered admitting the felony conviction for the crime of man-
slaughter but “alleged that the party killed was his wife’s paramour.”416 Mr. 
Dowell agreed to the divorce but sought to block his wife from receiving 
any share of his estate.417 The court ultimately awarded a division of proper-
ty that included a life estate interest in some property in favor of Mrs. Dow-
ell.418 
In the second Dowell case, the question was how to value Mrs. Dow-
ell’s life estate interest when some of the property was sold.419 The Supreme 
Court of Arkansas acknowledged that courts throughout the country “have 
employed a variety of methods in determining the present value of such life 
estate.”420 The court said that the English common law rule was to consider 
a life estate as equal in value to one-third of the fee estate.421 The court, 
however, found that this method had been rejected in a 1916 divorce case.422 
The court decided that the most appropriate method is to compute the value 
of the life estate holder’s interest “by use of legally recognized life and an-
nuity tables on the basis of appellee’s age at the time of the sale, and on the 
basis of the proceeds realized by the sale after deducting her proportionate 
part of the costs of the sale.”423 
In Act 350 of 1981, the General Assembly adopted an act “to establish 
a simple and accurate method for computing the present value of both vest-
ed life and remainder interests in property through the use of actuarial tables 
and to make the actuarial tables used in connection therewith current.”424 For 
life estates, this act provides: 
In any legal proceeding wherein the court shall decree that a vested right 
to future income for life from property is to be commuted and an amount 
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payable in gross be substituted for the property right, then the value of 
the interest shall be computed by use of the table and in the manner de-
scribed in the example appearing in § 18-2-105 unless parties to the pro-




The table in Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-2-105(a) is lengthy, 
giving the life expectancy for every age from 1 through 100 with interest 
rates at 4%, 6%, 8%, 10% and 12%.426 The act states that the interest rate to 
be used for the calculation is “the prevailing interest rates obtainable for 
investments.”427 Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-2-105(b) provides the 
following codified example: 
Example: Joe Doe is entitled to receive the income from a principal sum 
of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) during the life of one Martha Jones, 
aged fifty-five (55). There is a remainder estate in favor of Timothy Doe. 
In an appropriate proceeding a court in Arkansas has determined that the 
life tenant is to be paid a lump sum in commutation of his right to in-
come for the life of Martha Jones; the court has further determined that 
four percent (4%) is the rate of interest obtainable on an investment of a 
sum of the size of the principal sum. In the table, follow the left-hand 
column, which is labeled “age”, down vertically until fifty-five (55) is 
reached; then move horizontally until the column headed “4%” is inter-
sected. At the intersection is found the figure: 15.6110. This figure is to 
be multiplied by the yearly income, which is found by multiplying the 
principal sum by the appropriate rate of interest. In this case that would 
be ten thousand dollars ($10,000) multiplied by .04 equalling [sic] four 
hundred dollars ($400). Then 15.6110 multiplied by four hundred dollars 
($400) equals six thousand two hundred forty-four dollars and forty 
cents ($6,244.40). This is the sum which the court would direct to be 
paid to Joe Doe in commutation of his income right. Timothy Doe would 
be paid three thousand seven hundred fifty-five dollars and sixty cents 
($3,755.60). See § 18-2-106: principal sum ten thousand dollars 
($10,000) minus commuted life interest six thousand two hundred forty-
four dollars and forty cents ($6,244.40) equals commuted remainder 




Notably, the life expectancy table has not been updated since 1981 and 
was based on a life expectancy of 74.97 years.429 As of the writing of this 
article, the United States life expectancy has increased to 78.8 years accord-
 
 425. Id. § 18-2-102 (Repl. 2015). 
 426. Id. § 18-2-105 (Repl. 2015). 
 427. Id. § 18-2-104 (Repl. 2015). 
 428. Id. § 18-2-105. 
 429. See id. 
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ing to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.430 The chart also does 
not account for differences in life expectancies for women and men, which 
currently stands at 81.2 years and 76.4 years, respectively.431 Updating this 
chart might be an appropriate task for a future meeting of the General As-
sembly. 
VI. THE STUDY 
An essential question when considering the impact of dower and curte-
sy is whether the existence of the law impacts the way that people buy and 
sell real estate. In other words, does the thousand-year-old concept of dower 
and curtesy still make a difference today? This is a very difficult question to 
answer. To help shed some light on this question, I undertook a review of 
real estate transactions in Pulaski County, Arkansas, to see how often dower 
or curtesy becomes an issue in transferring real estate.432 
The question, though, is how to look at a deed and be able to definitive-
ly say that a conveyance required a spouse’s joinder to waive dower and 
curtesy. Just because two people sign a deed as grantor does not mean that 
both had to sign because of dower or curtesy. It could be that both parties 
had vested legal title to the property. To answer this question, I had to de-
termine how a person took title, then look at how the same person conveyed 
title in a subsequent transaction. It is possible to say that dower or curtesy 
definitely played a role in the transaction if a person took title in his or her 
sole capacity but subsequently conveyed the property with the joinder of a 
spouse. 
To conduct this study, I selected fifteen residential neighborhoods 
throughout the county representing a geographic and economic cross-section 
of Pulaski County. I then examined a list of each warranty deed recorded in 
those neighborhoods from April 2001 through October 2015. This amounted 
to 2,027 warranty deeds.433 
I first identified the transactions during the specified time period where 
the same person took title then subsequently transferred it to someone else 
in the same time period. Out of the original 2,027 warranty deeds, I found 
that 1,043 deeds fit this description. In other words, 1,043 of the deeds were 
part of the cycle where the same person was both a grantee and a grantor of 
 
 430. Life Expectancy, CDC.GOV (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/life-
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nchs/data/databriefs/ db168.htm. 
 432. Pulaski County is the largest county in Arkansas and contains Arkansas’s capital and 
largest city, Little Rock. 
 433. See Appendix A for a list of the Instrument Numbers of the deeds included in the 
study. 
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the same property within the study timeframe. I refer to those deeds collec-
tively as the “Corresponding Deeds” for ease of reference. I refer to the deed 
where the person took title (as grantee) as the “Vesting Deed,” and the deed 
where the person conveyed title (as grantor) out of his or her name as the 
“Conveyancing Deed.” 
A problem with this approach quickly becomes apparent in that there 
are some deeds that are both Vesting Deeds and Conveyancing Deeds and, 
thus, are double-counted. For instance, assume that A took title on July 1, 
2001 in Deed #1. Deed #1 would be A’s Vesting Deed. A then conveyed 
title to B on January 1, 2005 in Deed #2. Deed #2 would be B’s Vesting 
Deed but A’s Conveyancing Deed. Deed #2 identifies if B took title with his 
or her spouse, but it also identifies if A required the joinder of his or her 
spouse to convey title. I refer to these deeds playing double-duty as “Double 
Deeds” for lack of a better term. 
Several weaknesses to the approach that I chose for this task are appar-
ent. First, for the sake of not being overwhelmed with information, I specifi-
cally excluded quitclaim deeds from the search. This means that there may 
be additional sales that I overlooked. Second, the sheer volume of deeds 
reviewed probably means that some portion of qualifying transactions may 
have been inadvertently overlooked while sorting through the data. To re-
duce this risk, I utilized an Excel spreadsheet to identify duplicate values to 
highlight where the same name appeared as grantor then appeared again as 
grantee. This method, however, is not foolproof. Third, it is possible that I 
missed some qualifying transactions because the grantor changed his or her 
name without identifying that on the face of the deed, such as a woman who 
changes her name after marriage. Fourth, where two people had the same 
last name, I assumed that they were married unless there was evidence on 
the face of the deed making it clearly apparent that they were not married. 
This means that there could be some transactions included where the parties 
had the same last name but were not married. Despite these flaws, as dis-
cussed further below, the methodology still revealed a significant number of 
transactions where dower and curtesy played a role in the transaction. 
A. The Neighborhoods 
It is best to say a few words about the neighborhoods used for the study 
before digging into the analysis. The neighborhoods are Edgewood in Jack-
sonville, Belmont in Little Rock, Briarwood in Little Rock, Brodie Creek in 
Little Rock, Chenal Ridge in Little Rock, Edge Hill in Little Rock, Forest 
Park in Little Rock, Heatherbrae in Little Rock, Hickory Hills in Little 
Rock, Leawood Heights in Little Rock, Oak Forest in Little Rock, Pleasant 
Valley Manor in Little Rock, Yorkwood in Little Rock, Arrowhead Manor 
in North Little Rock, and Austin Lakes in Sherwood. Little Rock has the 
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largest representation as the largest city within the study area, though I in-
tentionally selected neighborhoods from different parts of the city, such as 
Chenal Ridge in West Little Rock, Leawood Heights in Midtown Little 
Rock, and Yorkwood in Southwest Little Rock. I selected neighborhoods 
from different parts of the city to determine whether socio-economic differ-
ences might play a role. For instance, homes in West Little Rock tend to be 
more expensive and newer than those in Southwest Little Rock. Also, homes 
in Midtown Little Rock tend to be older than those in other parts of the city. 
Most of these neighborhoods are actually comprised of multiple platted 
additions. For purposes of this analysis, I examined the plats with similar 
names, and chose to omit some phases of subdivisions to control the volume 
of deeds analyzed, which means that I omitted some parts of what might be 
traditionally considered part of these neighborhoods.434 
Briarwood had the most activity during the study period with 481 total 
warranty deeds of which 252 were Corresponding Deeds. Hickory Hills had 
the least activity during the study period with 29 total warranty deeds of 
which just four were Corresponding Deeds. In total, the neighborhoods had 
135 total warranty deeds on average, of which 70 were Corresponding 
























 434. See Appendix B for a list of the subdivision additions utilized. 
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April 2001 – October 2015 
Neighborhoods 




Arrowhead Manor 132 67 
Austin Lakes 227 139 
Belmont 51 18 
Briarwood 481 252 
Brodie Creek 184 143 
Chenal Ridge 99 48 
Edge Hill 56 30 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville 65 22 
Forest Park 78 43 
Heatherbrae 89 42 
Hickory Hills Addition 29 4 
Leawood Heights 280 136 
Oak Forest 117 56 
Pleasant Valley Manor 40 22 
Yorkwood 99 21 
Total: 2027 1043 
 
I also wanted to see how economic issues might affect the dower and 
curtesy issue, which meant calculating the sales price of each house based 
on the reported transfer tax paid.435 For this calculation, I sorted through the 
list of deeds and eliminated all transactions that did not show evidence of 
transfer tax payments. I also eliminated one multi-parcel transaction in the 
Briarwood Neighborhood that greatly skewed the average and appeared to 
be a very unusual transaction. In total, transfer tax was paid on 1,510 of the 
all warranty deeds and 815 of the Corresponding Deeds. The remaining 517 
of the all warranty deeds and 228 of the Corresponding Deeds represented 
gifts, conveyances to trusts, property divisions from divorces, correction 
deeds, or other conveyances not requiring payment of the transfer tax. After 
eliminating these deeds, the average sales price for all of the neighborhoods 
 
 435. Arkansas requires a transfer tax of $3.30 per thousand on all transactions in excess 
of $100. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-60-105 (Supp. 2015). The purchase price can be calculat-
ed by dividing the total amount of transfer tax paid as shown on the deed by $3.30 and multi-
plying the result by $1,000. Id. 
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was $223,200.00 based on all warranty deeds and $216,422.00 based on the 
Corresponding Deeds. Edge Hill had the highest average sales price at 
$1,546,875.00 based on all warranty deeds and $1,518,217.39 based on the 
Corresponding Deeds. Belmont had the lowest average sales price at 
$28,438.87 based on all warranty deeds and $22,900.00 based on the Corre-
sponding Deeds. Two of the neighborhoods, Edge Hill and Hickory Hills, 
had average prices in excess of $1,000,000.00 and four of the neighbor-
hoods, Arrowhead Manor, Belmond, Edgewood and Yorkwood, had aver-
age prices less than $100,000.00. 
 
April 2001 – October 2015 
 Neighborhoods 
Average Sales Price 
of All Deeds (ex-
cluding $0 transac-
tions) 
Average Sales Price of 
Corresponding Trans-
actions (excluding $0 
transactions) 
Arrowhead Manor $74,427.08 $76,729.17 
Austin Lakes $152,908.11 $154,252.25 
Belmont $28,483.87 $22,900.00 
Briarwood $237,269.89 $137,062.18 
Brodie Creek $237,101.35 $236,652.54 
Chenal Ridge $296,118.42 $314,682.93 
Edge Hill $1,546,875.00 $1,518,217.39 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville $79,153.85 $75,357.14 
Forest Park $180,285.71 $193,085.71 
Heatherbrae $215,245.90 $208,064.52 
Hickory Hills  
Addition $1,045,625.00 $1,150,000.00 
Leawood Heights $187,794.52 $200,000.00 
Oak Forest $117,681.82 $163,422.22 
Pleasant  
Valley Manor $200,580.65 $201,222.22 
Yorkwood $93,153.85 $98,230.77 
Total Average:436 $223,200.00 $216,422.00 
 
 436. The total average was calculated by multiplying the average sales price of each 
neighborhood by the number of deeds originating in each neighborhood then averaging the 
result. This method prevented extremely large sales and extremely small sales from unduly 
adjusting the average. 
408 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
B. The Results 
I next analyzed the 1,043 Corresponding Deeds to see how many times 
the same person or entity took title (a Vesting Deed) who then conveyed the 
property at a later date within the study period (a Conveyancing Deed). As 
noted above, some deeds played both roles in the study (Double Deeds). I 
identified 441 of the Corresponding Deeds as Vesting Deeds, 436 as Con-
veyancing Deeds, and 166 as Double Deeds. 
 
 













Manor 32 29 6 
Austin Lakes 58 55 26 
Belmont 10 7 1 
Briarwood 109 108 35 
Brodie Creek 54 55 34 
Chenal Ridge 20 19 9 
Edge Hill 14 14 2 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville 9 10 3 
Forest Park 16 16 11 
Heatherbrae 18 19 5 
Hickory Hills  
Addition 2 2 0 
Leawood  
Heights 54 56 26 
Oak Forest 25 25 6 
Pleasant Valley  
Manor 10 10 2 
Yorkwood 10 11 0 
Total: 441 436 166 
 
2016] DOWER AND CURTESY IN ARKANSAS 409 
I then further sorted these deeds to see how often someone took title 
without a spouse listed (a Vesting Deed), but subsequently included a 
spouse when he or she conveyed the property at a later date (a Conveyanc-
ing Deed). I referred to these deeds as “Dower/Curtesy” deeds because these 
are the ones where dower or curtesy ended up playing a role in the transac-
tion. I found a total of 107 deeds that fell into the category of Dow-
er/Curtesy Corresponding Vesting Deeds and 112 that fell into the category 
of Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing Deeds, for a total of 219 
deeds. 
 






Total Dower/Curtesy  
Corresponding Con-
veyancing Deeds 
Arrowhead Manor 10 9 
Austin Lakes 18 18 
Belmont 2 2 
Briarwood 29 30 
Brodie Creek 12 12 
Chenal Ridge 4 4 
Edge Hill 2 2 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville 6 6 
Forest Park 1 3 
Heatherbrae 2 2 
Hickory Hills  
Addition 0 0 
Leawood Heights 12 14 
Oak Forest 3 4 
Pleasant Valley  
Manor 2 2 
Yorkwood 4 4 
Total: 107 112 
 
 
Taking into account the dual role played by the Double Deeds, 17.63% 
of all Corresponding Vesting Deeds were also Dower/Curtesy Correspond-
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ing Vesting Deeds and 18.60% of all Corresponding Conveyancing Deeds 
were also Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Vesting Deeds. 
 
 
April 2001 – October 2015 
Neighborhoods 
Percentage of  
Corresponding Vesting  





Deeds That  
Are Also Dower/ 
Curtesy Deeds 
Arrowhead Manor 26.32% 25.71% 
Austin Lakes 21.43% 22.22% 
Belmont 18.18% 25.00% 
Briarwood 20.14% 20.98% 
Brodie Creek 13.64% 13.48% 
Chenal Ridge 13.79% 14.29% 
Edge Hill 12.50% 12.50% 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville 50.00% 46.15% 
Forest Park 3.70% 11.11% 
Heatherbrae 8.70% 8.33% 
Hickory Hills  
Addition 0.00% 0.00% 
Leawood Heights 15.00% 17.07% 
Oak Forest 9.68% 12.90% 
Pleasant Valley  
Manor 16.67% 16.67% 
Yorkwood 40.00% 36.36% 
Total Average: 17.63% 18.60% 
 
As this chart indicates, there were several outliers. Most notably Edge-
wood of Jacksonville and Yorkwood were both on the high side. On the 
other hand, Forest Park, Heatherbrae, Oak Forest, and Hickory Hills were on 
the low side (less than 10%) of Corresponding Vesting Deeds, and Heather-
brea and Hickory Hills were on the low side (less than 10%) of Correspond-
ing Conveyancing Deeds. Hickory Hills, though, should be discounted con-
siderably because it only had two Corresponding Vesting Deeds and two 
Corresponding Conveyancing Deeds. Despite the outliers, the total averages 
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are confirmed by examining the median of the averages. The median of the 
averages of Corresponding Vesting Deeds was 15.00%, and the median of 
the averages of Corresponding Conveyancing Deeds was 16.67%, which are 
both close to the total averages. 
A question is whether the economic sophistication of the parties con-
tributed to these outliers. An argument could be made for economic sophis-
tication playing a role by examining the percentage of Dower/Curtesy Deeds 
relative to the Average Sales Price. As noted in the chart below, all four of 
the neighborhoods with a higher than average sales price had lower than 
average rates of Dower/Curtesy Deeds. On the other hand, five of the neigh-
borhoods on the lower end of the economic scale also had lower than aver-
age rates of Dower/Curtesy Deeds. Additionally, Edge Hill, which had the 
highest average sales price, was reasonably close to the average rate of 
Dower/Curtesy Deeds in both categories. Meanwhile, Belmont, which had 
the lowest average sales price, was very close to the average number of 
Dower/Curtesy Vesting Deeds though it was somewhat high on the number 
of Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Deeds. These disparities seem to belie any 
notion that economic sophistication is a driving determinate in whether 
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April 2001 – October 2015 
Neighborhoods 
Average  





Percentage of  
Corresponding  
Vesting Deeds 







That Are Also 
Dower/ 
Curtesy Deeds 
Belmont $22,900.00 18.18% 25.00% 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville $75,357.14 50.00% 46.15% 
Arrowhead  
Manor $76,729.17 26.32% 25.71% 
Yorkwood $98,230.77 40.00% 36.36% 
Briarwood $137,062.18 20.14% 20.98% 
Austin Lakes $154,252.25 21.43% 22.22% 
Oak Forest $163,422.22 9.68% 12.90% 
Forest Park $193,085.71 3.70% 11.11% 
Leawood  
Heights $200,000.00 15.00% 17.07% 
Pleasant  
Valley  
Manor $201,222.22 16.67% 16.67% 
Heatherbrae $208,064.52 8.70% 8.33% 
Brodie Creek $236,652.54 13.64% 13.48% 
Chenal Ridge $314,682.93 13.79% 14.29% 
Hickory Hills  
Addition $1,150,000.00 0.00% 0.00% 
Edge Hill $1,518,217.39 12.50% 12.50% 
Total Average: $216,422.00 17.63% 18.60% 
 
 
I next broke down the Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Vesting Deeds to 
see how the grantee took title. Specifically, I wanted to know how often the 
deed recited that the grantee was married or unmarried. I found that 42.06% 
of these deeds listed the grantee as a married person, but did not list his or 
her spouse. I found that 29.90% of the deeds did not list the grantee’s mari-
tal status one way or the other, and that 28.04% of the deeds listed the grant-
ee as unmarried. 
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Manor 3 5 2 
Austin Lakes 8 10 0 
Belmont 2 0 0 
Briarwood 8 11 10 
Brodie Creek 2 4 6 
Chenal Ridge 0 3 1 
Edge Hill 0 0 2 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville 1 3 2 
Forest Park 0 0 1 
Heatherbrae 0 1 1 
Hickory Hills  
Addition 0 0 0 
Leawood  
Heights 4 5 3 
Oak Forest 0 1 2 
Pleasant Valley  
Manor 1 0 1 
Yorkwood 1 2 1 
Total: 30 45 32 
 











Looking at these deeds as a percentage of all Corresponding Vesting 
and Double Deeds shows no obvious correlation between the cost of the 
homes in a neighborhood and the frequency of a grantee taking title as un-
married, married but with an intentionally omitted spouse or with the status 
not listed. This is demonstrated by the chart below, which is in order of 
















Status Not Listed 
30% 
Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Vesting Deeds 
Unmarried Grantee Married Grantee Status Not Listed
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Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Vesting Deeds as a Percentage of all  
Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Vesting and Double Deeds 








Belmont 100.00% N/A N/A 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville 16.67% 50.00% 33.33% 
Arrowhead  
Manor 30.00% 50.00% 20.00% 
Yorkwood 25.00% 50.00% 25.00% 
Briarwood 27.59% 37.93% 34.48% 
Austin Lakes 44.44% 55.56% N/A 
Oak Forest N/A 33.33% 66.67% 
Forest Park N/A N/A 100.00% 
Leawood  
Heights 33.33% 41.67% 25.00% 
Pleasant Valley  
Manor 50.00% N/A 50.00% 
Heatherbrae N/A 50.00% 50.00% 
Brodie Creek 16.67% 33.33% 50.00% 
Chenal Ridge N/A 75.00% 25.00% 
Hickory Hills  
Addition N/A N/A N/A 
Edge Hill 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
 
 
I took a closer look at these results, again looking for a possible eco-
nomic connection in the pattern. I first calculated the average sales price of 
houses for each of these three categories amongst these deeds: the Unmar-
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Average Sales Price of Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Vesting Deeds 









Manor $90,333.33 $62,333.33 $86,000.00 
Austin Lakes $154,333.33 $149,000.00 N/A 
Belmont $25,000.00 N/A N/A 
Briarwood $140,571.43 $131,300.00 $121,625.00 
Brodie Creek $137,500.00 $376,000.00 $244,500.00 
Chenal Ridge N/A $424,500.00 $366,000.00 
Edge Hill N/A N/A $1,295,000.00 
Edgewood  
of Jacksonville $53,000.00 $60,500.00 $75,000.00 
Forest Park N/A N/A N/A 
Heatherbrae N/A $244,000.00 $6,000.00 
Hickory  
Hills Addition N/A N/A N/A 
Leawood  
Heights $218,750.00 $147,750.00 $182,500.00 
Oak Forest N/A $89,000.00 $50,000.00 
Pleasant  
Valley Manor $255,000.00 N/A $213,000.00 
Yorkwood N/A $72,500.00 N/A 
 
I then looked at whether the average price in each of these three catego-
ries was higher or lower than the same neighborhood’s average sales price. 
The chart below is in order of neighborhood with the lowest average sales 
price to highest sales price. The average sales price tends to be higher in 
poorer neighborhoods when the grantee is unmarried than when the grantee 
is married. This trend is somewhat supported by the lack of a pattern in the 
Status Not Listed category. In other words, because the Status Not Listed 
category presumably includes both married and unmarried grantees, one 
would expect, as is the case, a mix of results if there is truly a pattern of 
unmarried grantees in poorer neighborhoods paying more than their married 
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Deviation from Average Sales Price of Dower/Curtesy Corresponding 
Vesting Deeds Relative to All Corresponding Transactions 








Belmont 109.17% N/A N/A 
Edgewood of  
Jacksonville 70.33% 80.28% 99.53% 
Arrowhead Manor 117.73% 81.24% 112.08% 
Yorkwood N/A 73.81% N/A 
Briarwood 102.56% 95.80% 88.74% 
Austin Lakes 100.05% 96.60% N/A 
Oak Forest N/A 54.46% 30.60% 
Forest Park N/A N/A N/A 
Leawood Heights 109.38% 73.88% 91.25% 
Pleasant Valley Manor 126.73% N/A 105.85% 
Heatherbrae N/A 117.27% 2.88% 
Brodie Creek 58.10% 158.88% 103.32% 
Chenal Ridge N/A 134.90% 116.31% 
Hickory Hills Addition N/A N/A N/A 
Edge Hill N/A N/A 85.30% 
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Deviation from Average Sales Price of Dower/Curtesy Corresponding 
Vesting Deeds Relative to All Corresponding Transactions 








Belmont -9.17% N/A N/A 
Edgewood of Jacksonville 29.67% 19.72% 0.47% 
Arrowhead Manor -17.73% 18.76% -12.08% 
Yorkwood N/A 26.19% N/A 
Briarwood -2.56% 4.20% 11.26% 
Austin Lakes -0.05% 3.40% N/A 
Oak Forest N/A 45.54% 69.40% 
Forest Park N/A N/A N/A 
Leawood Heights -9.38% 26.13% 8.75% 
Pleasant Valley Manor -26.73% N/A -5.85% 
Heatherbrae N/A -17.27% 97.12% 
Brodie Creek 41.90% -58.88% -3.32% 
Chenal Ridge N/A -34.90% -16.31% 
Hickory Hills Addition N/A N/A N/A 
Edge Hill N/A N/A 14.70% 
 
A title agent, attorney, or other party conducting a closing, will insist 
on a spouse who does not have record title signing some form of release to 
abolish the inchoate dower or curtesy interest. Without this release, there is 
a risk that the titled spouse’s death could result in the vesting of the inchoate 
dower or curtesy interest causing the buyer, even a bona fide purchaser for 
value, being divested of some portion of the purchased interest. This would 
in turn trigger a claim against the title insurance. The closing agent, there-
fore, requires the spouse’s release to prevent this from happening. 
Another area of inquiry, therefore, is to examine how the spouse re-
leased his or her dower or curtesy interest in the Dower/Curtesy Corre-
sponding Conveyancing Deeds. There are two ways for a spouse to release 
his or her dower or curtesy interest, that is: execute the deed as a co-grantor 
or sign a separate release of the dower or curtesy interest.437 The former is 
 
 437. The separate release is often incorporated into the deed with language along the lines 
of: “Jane Doe hereby executes this deed for the sole purpose of releasing her dower interest in 
and to the property.” 
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much more dangerous for the non-vested spouse because it exposes him or 
her to a potential suit for breach of warranties of title in the deed.438 There is 
no exposure for breach of the warranties of title in a deed if the spouse 
merely releases his or her dower or curtesy interest. 
To begin this analysis, I started by identifying the total number of 
Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing Deeds. The analysis shows 
that of the Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing Deeds, 47.32% 
were wives just releasing dower, 24.10% were wives being listed as co-
grantors, 20.54% were husbands just releasing curtesy and 8.04% were hus-

































 438. See generally Foster & McKinney, supra note 122, at 68. 
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Manor 3 0 5 1 
Austin Lakes 3 0 12 3 
Belmont 0 0 1 1 
Briarwood 11 2 12 5 
Brodie Creek 2 3 4 3 
Chenal Ridge 1 1 2 0 
Edge Hill 1 0 1 0 
Edgewood 
of Jacksonville 0 0 5 1 
Forest Park 0 0 3 0 
Heatherbrae 1 1 0 0 
Hickory  
Hills Addition 0 0 0 0 
Leawood Heights 3 0 5 6 
Oak Forest 1 1 1 1 
Pleasant  
Valley Manor 0 1 1 0 
Yorkwood 1 0 1 2 
Total: 27 9 53 23 
 
24.10% 8.04% 47.32% 20.54% 
 


















Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing 
Deeds 
Wife as Grantor Husband as Grantor
Wife to Release Dower Husband to Release Curtesy
Wife as Grantor 
34% 
Wife to Release 
Dower 
66% 
Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing 
Deeds–Wives Only 
Wife as Grantor Wife to Release Dower




Notably, the analysis showed an exceptional difference between the 
number of women who did not have legal title to the property owned by 
their husbands versus the same number of men who did not have legal title 
to the property of their wives. A woman was two and a half times (2.5x) 
more likely not to have legal title to her husband’s property than a man was 
to have legal title to his wife’s property. In other words, women were the 
party without title in 71.43% of all Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Convey-
ancing Deeds, compared to husbands being the party without title just 
28.57% of the time. This illustrates that it appears much more common for a 
man to take title to property without his wife rather than the other way 
around. Also, wives were somewhat more likely to release dower using the 
more dangerous method of being a co-grantor (the method used by 34% of 







Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing 
Deeds–Husbands Only 
Husband as Grantor Husband to Release Curtesy




Interestingly, for both husbands and wives, the average transaction cost 
tended to be higher when the husband or wife was a co-grantor rather than 
mere releaser of dower or curtesy. Excluding transactions that did not have 
consideration, the average sales price when the spouse was a co-grantor was 
$208,190.00 for wives and $268,500.00 for husbands. Also excluding trans-
actions that did not have consideration, the average sales price when the 
wife merely released dower was $186,638.00, and when the husband merely 
released curtesy was $157,049.00. In other words, the sales price was 
10.35% higher when the wife released her dower using the riskier method of 
being a co-grantor rather than merely releasing dower. For husbands, the 
sales price was 41.51% higher when the husband released his curtesy using 
the riskier method of being a co-grantor rather than merely releasing curte-
sy. There is no obvious explanation for this discrepancy other than to as-
sume that the calculation for husbands is more susceptible to influence 






Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing 
Deeds–Husbands vs. Wives 
Husbands Wives
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C. Summary of Findings 
The study examined 2,027 warranty deeds filed from April 2001 
through October 2015 in fifteen neighborhoods in Pulaski County, Arkan-
sas, with the purpose of determining the prevalence of dower and curtesy 
rights. The study found that 18.6% of the applicable conveyances required 
the joinder of a non-titled spouse to release dower and curtesy. When a per-
son took title without a spouse, 42.06% of the deeds identified the grantee as 
married, 29.9% did not identify marital status, and 28.04% identified the 
grantee as unmarried, thus demonstrating that conscious omission of a 
spouse from title is a common practice. These omitted spouses are far more 
likely to be women than men with the woman being the omitted spouse in 
71.43% of the applicable deeds. The study showed that 34% of women and 
28% of men released their dower or curtesy rights using the riskier method 
of being a co-grantor rather than merely releasing the dower and curtesy 
rights without becoming liable for the warranties of title in the deed. The 
study showed no significant differences based on the value of the houses 
meaning that economic sophistication, or the ability to afford sophisticated 
advisors, seemed to make no difference in how couples decided to take title. 















Dower/Curtesy Corresponding Conveyancing 
Deeds–Average Sales Price by Method 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Dower and curtesy are ancient legal doctrines imported from English 
common law and present from the dawn of Arkansas’s statehood. To use a 
cliché, they are a time-honored tradition. Dower and curtsey laws have 
evolved significantly over time, morphing from once distinct rights to 
providing the same benefits to both men and women. Both men and women 
receive an interest in the real and personal property of their spouses, though 
the scope of those rights vary depending on whether there are children and 
whether the land is deemed ancestral. 
Arkansas holds firm to the doctrines, though many states have aban-
doned dower and curtesy. The question becomes whether Arkansas should 
continue to do so. The future of dower and curtesy is a matter for the Arkan-
sas General Assembly to decide. The Supreme Court of Arkansas invalidat-
ed dower and curtesy in 1981, but the General Assembly at the time elected 
to make the necessary fixes to pass constitutional muster and restore the 
rights in their current form.439 During the 2015 meeting of the General As-
sembly, House Bill 1538 was introduced to repeal dower and curtesy, and 
though the bill did not pass, questions may continue to arise about the future 
of the rights. 
Policy arguments exist on both sides. On the side of eliminating dower 
and curtesy, it is true that the national trend tends to be toward elimination, 
and none of the states adjoining Arkansas retain the rights, at least not in 
their original form. Further, eliminating the rights simplifies transactions 
and eliminates the risk of a dowered spouse taking rights away from a bona 
fide third party purchaser. 
On the side of retaining dower and curtesy, the rights have existed 
since the beginning of Arkansas’s statehood, and no such time-tested and 
ancient right should be eliminated casually, without full consideration of the 
consequences. For instance, how many spouses have relied on dower and 
curtesy when consenting to the use of assets of the marriage to purchase 
property without both spouses taking title? In other words, are there wives 
who have agreed to let their husbands omit them from title but who take 
comfort in knowing that they have some protected economic interest 
through dower? There is no easy way to know this, but the study presented 
in this article shows 18.6% of all residential transactions result in a spouse 
obtaining dower or curtesy rights. Surely not all of those are ignorant of the 
rights provided by dower or curtesy, and at least some have relied on it. Fur-
ther, serious consideration should be given to the possibly disproportionate 
effect that elimination of the rights may have on women, as the study also 
 
 439. See Stokes v. Stokes, 271 Ark. 300, 301, 613 S.W.2d 372, 374 (1981); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 28-11-101 et seq. (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2015). 
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revealed that women are more than two and a half times as likely as men to 
be omitted from title. 
In deciding the fate of dower and curtesy rights, consideration should 
also be given to the Supreme Court of Arkansas’s adoption of the following 
common law principle more than a century ago: 
Marriage, in the eye of the law, is held to be a valuable consideration, 
and the wife is regarded as a purchaser for a valuable consideration of all 
property which accrued to her by virtue of her marital rights . . . Not only 




The demise of dower and curtesy, particularly if it is made retroactive 
to existing marriages, would raise the question of whether the court’s obser-
vation still remains true today. The demise of the rights would also raise 
questions about the meaningfulness of the old marriage vows, “With all my 
worldly goods I thee endow . . . .” This, though, is a policy question for the 
General Assembly and not a question answerable in the law. Perhaps the 














 440. Bookout v. Bookout, 150 Ind. 63, 49 N.E. 824, 825 (1898); Barton v. Wilson, 116 
Ark. 400, 408, 172 S.W. 1032, 1034 (1915). 
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APPENDIX B 
Arrowhead Manor: 
Arrowhead Manor Addition to North Little Rock 
 
Austin Lakes: 
Austin Lakes Addition to the City of Sherwood 
 
Belmont: 
Belmont Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Briarwood: 
Briarwood Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Brodie Creek: 
Brodie Creek Community Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Chenal Ridge: 
Chenal Ridge, Phase I, Addition to the City of Little Rock 
Chenal Ridge, Phase II, Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Edge Hill: 
Edge Hill Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Edgewood: 
Edgewood Addition to the City of Little Rock 
Replat of Edgewood Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Forest Park: 
Forest Park Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Heatherbrae: 
Heatherbrae Addition to the City of Little Rock 
Heatherbrae Addition, Phase II, to the City of Little Rock 
 
Hickory Hills: 
Hickory Hills Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Leawood Heights: 
Leawood Heights First Addition to the City of Little Rock 
Leawood Heights Second Addition to the City of Little Rock 
Leawood Heights Fourth Addition to the City of Little Rock 
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Oak Forest: 
Oak Forest Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Pleasant Valley: 
Pleasant Valley Manor Addition to the City of Little Rock 
 
Yorkwood: 
Yorkwood Addition to the City of Little Rock 
Yorkwood Addition, Phase II, to the City of Little Rock 
Yorkwood Addition, Phase III, to the City of Little Rock 
 
 
 
 
